Central Law Journal.

St. Louis, Mo., June 24, 1921.

PSYCHO-PATHOLOGY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW.

A recent decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal has aroused public interest in legal circles in England over the possibility that the science of psychiatry may play a large part in the future determination of the mental responsibility of those charged with crime. Rex v. Quarmby (Decided Mar. 21, 1921.) The facts in this case are stated by the Solicitors Journal (March 26, 1921):

"The Court of Criminal Appeal had to consider on Monday in Rex. v. Quarmby (Times, 22nd inst.), a case which has excited some public interest and which has been the subject of correspondence in our columns. It will be recollected that the prisoner, a man of forty-five, who had lived a blameless life until infatuation for a woman led him astray, confessed the murder of his mistress, but pleaded "irresistible impulse," on indictment for the crime before Mr. Justice Acton at Blackpool. The crime was clearly premeditated, as he had purchased the knife with which it was committed some time beforehand; he was convicted and sentenced to death, but at the trial some rather remarkable evidence was given as regards the state of the prisoner's mind by an official doctor. The prisoner had confessed, but the state of his mind was in doubt. The doctor accordingly, with the prisoner's consent, subjected him to hypnotism and interrogated him as to the crime while under hypnotic influence. The object of Dr. Wilkinson, the doctor in question, was the humane one of trying to ascertain whether or not the prisoner's mind was normal. The result of his investigation, which was conducted on lines of psycho-analysis, would appear to have been that the prisoner, who up to middle life had led a continent life and then had suddenly yielded to sensual temptation, was the victim of a "complex" which had gradually acquired force, until it had become an "irresistible impulse" which the prisoner could not resist. How far such a theory is capable of being maintained in psychology or in medicine we cannot pretend to say: it opens up an additional and novel possibility. But clearly such defence is unknown to the law of England, and the Court of Criminal Appeal could do nothing else than dismiss the prisoner's appeal."

Justice Darling, who presided in the Quarmby case, declared that there are obvious difficulties which beset an English judge when he is required to explain to the jury the law respecting mental responsibility for crime, and that these difficulties would be increased if the tests set up by psychiatrists should be introduced in evidence and must be explained to a jury.

We do not believe that the difficulties in the way of application of the new science of psycho-analysis should deter police officers, judges and legislators from doing their utmost to put these principles into effect. The present practice of trying men over and over again for the same offenses and then turning them out to prey upon society, to steal, to burn, to kill, undeterred by any fear of punishment because of a defective affectivity rather than a defective intelligence is social suicide. The proportion of crime committed by normal persons or by persons of defective intelligence is, according to the experience of continental scientists, almost negligible. The great source of crime is *dementia praecox*. Here the intelligence is often only slightly subnormal and the usual tests of insanity would disclose no abnormal mental conditions. But the tests developed in the great psychiatric clinics at Zurich, Munich and other European centers will, in less than two hours' examination, disclose what, if any, defect exists in respect to one's affectivity. Here is where the psychologist is needed—not the physician. Dr. Hickson, the great psychiatrist of the Chicago Municipal Court, and one of the few experts in psychiatry in this country, in explaining the uselessness of clinical methods of investigation is such cases said:

"From the clinical side in a large percentage of these cases there is nothing very definite on which to establish a diag-

nosis; while at the same time the disease is of the utmost potentiality in the thinking and doing of the victim; this is sometimes called predementia or latent dementia praecox, which, as a matter of fact, is not latent at all except in the physical sense. The psychological side may be quite well advanced and highly potential criminally, while yet there are practically no definite physical or clinical signs; in fact, as a clinical entity dementia praecox in its present and advanced development can hardly be said to exist in a large proportion of cases.

"Many such physical or clinical signs should not be relied upon to make the diagnosis; and it is well known how well cases of dementia praecox paranoides can dissimulate on occasion. By the psychological method we take the diagnosis to the case in the same manner that we take the tests these days to the feeble-minded, and not sit by and have to wait developments, as in the case in many instances diagnosed by the ordinary clinical methods, and these tests are to the dementia praecox in the reliableness and applicability what the Binet-Simon tests are to the feeble-minded. These psychological symptoms are as clear and definite to the properly trained man as they are unknown or unappreciated to those unfamiliar with the method."

In the Municipal Court of Chicago, where a psycho-analysis is made of all doubtful cases, it has been discovered that 84 per cent of boy criminals were suffering with dementia praecox, which simply means that these boys have an incurable affectivity—an emotional defect—which will make them criminals all their lives and that society is not only in danger while they are allowed their freedom but that, if permitted to do so, they will rear a brood of morons or emotional defectives who, unless controlled by natural conditions or strict regulation, will ultimately destroy the civilization of any country.

This is the gloomy picture which psychiatrists present to the leaders of modern society, and the only hope they hold out is the confinement of such defectives in early life to Colonies of the Feeble Minded. The commendable efforts of Judge Olson, presiding Justice of the Municipal Court of Chicago, in establishing a Psychopathic Laboratory in connection with his court, has put the whole country under obligations to him, not only because of the success of the new mental tests which he has had set up, but because of the great interest he has aroused in this subject among lawyers and judges. The editor has learned of the organization of several new societies of mental hygiene formed to study the new science of psychiatry or psycho-analysis in its relation to the commission of crime. A new society of that kind has recently been formed in St. Louis, composed of a majority of the local judges, and is attracting lawyers, teachers and physicians to its ranks.

A glance at the shelves of any public library will show a surprising increase in the number of books on the subject of psycho-analysis or the new psychology as developed by Freud, Bleuler, Kraepelin and others in Europe. A study of this subject should be required in every law school so that those who shall be responsible for the administration of the criminal law in the future shall be fully prepared to deal with the tremendous increase in crime, which, according to psychiatrists, our misguided leniency with criminals has made possible.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS

FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS PROHIBITED FROM FORCING STATE BANKS TO CASH CHECKS AT PAR.—It was, beyond doubt, one of the purposes of Congress in passing the Federal Reserve Bank law, to establish universal exchange at par for checks sent in interstate commerce. But this purpose is defeated by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in American Bank & Trust Company v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (decided May 16, 1921).

The decision will tend to quiet a very bitter controversy which had arisen between state banks and Federal Reserve banks over the practice of the former to make a service charge for cashing their depositors' checks. The Federal Reserve banks were expressly prohibited by law from making a charge for collections and therefore felt that they should not be prevented from serving their customers by clearing checks on small state banks. In order to de-

feat the practice of the country banks of making an absolute collection charge on all checks cashed by it for another bank, a charge justified on the ground of the expense of remitting the proceeds to the forwarding bank, the Federal Reserve banks conceived the idea of accumulating a number of checks on a local bank and having them presented over the counter by an agent. No charge, of course, is made when checks are cashed in that way. In the present case the country banks of Georgia brought suit against the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta to enjoin this practice. In reversing a decree of the lower federal courts dismissing the bill, the Supreme Court ordered the hearing to proceed, to show whether in fact plaintiffs would be injured by the practice adopted by the defendants. The Court takes the position that, admitting the allegations of plaintiffs bill (which defendants say cannot be proven), their business would be destroyed by defendant's demand that all exchange shall be at par, then the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief asked.

Justice Holmes, who wrote the opinion for the Court, proceeds in his usual enigmatical manner to show when a right is not a right and becomes a wrong. This argument was in answer to defendants' contention that if their clients could cash the checks at par over plaintiffs' counters, they, as the agents of their clients, could do the same. Justice Holmes' answer to this apparently very plausible contention is characteristic of the philosopher-jurist of our greatest court. Justice Holmes said:

"The defendants say that the holder of a check has a right to present it to the bank upon which it was drawn for payment over the counter, and that however many checks he may hold he has the same right as to all of them and may present them all at once, whatever his motive or intent. They ask whether a mortgagee would be prevented from foreclosing because he acted from disinterested malevolence and not from a desire to get his money. But the word 'right' is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified. A man has at least as absolute a right to give his own money as he has to demand money from a party that has made no promise to him; yet if he gives it to induce another to steal or murder the purpose of the act makes it a crime.

"A bank that receives deposits to be drawn upon by check of course authorizes its depositors to draw checks against their accounts and holders of such checks to present them for payment. When we think of the ordinary case the right of the holder is so unimpeded that it seems to us absolute. But looked at from either side it cannot be so. The interests of business also are recognized as rights, protected against injury to a greater or less extent, and in case of conflict between the claims of business on the one side and of third persons on the other, lines have to be drawn that limit both. A man has a right to give advice, but advice given for the sole purpose of injuring another's business and effective on a large scale, might create a cause of action. Banks as we know them could not exist if they could not rely upon averages and lend a large part of the money that they receive from their depositors on the assumption that not more than a certain fraction of it will be demanded on any one day. If without a word of falsehood but acting from what we have called disinterested malevolence a man by persuasion should organize and carry into effect a run upon a bank and ruin it, we cannot doubt that an action would lie. A similar result, even if less complete in its effect, is to be expected from the course that the defendants are alleged to intend, and to determine whether they are authorized to follow that course it is not enough to refer to the general right of a holder of checks to present them, but it is necessary to consider whether the collection of checks and presenting them in a body for the purpose of breaking down the petitioner's business as now conducted is justified by the ulterior purpose in view."

POWER OF CONGRESS OVER PRIMARIES FOR THE SELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS.—The same serious mistake which the Supreme Courts of practically every state have made has now been made by the United States Supreme Court by a five to four decision, holding that primaries are not within the meaning of constitutional provisions referring to elections. Newberry v. United States, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 469.

Congress provided by law that no candidate for senator or representative should expend more than the amount allowed to candidates in the state in which he resides for the purpose of procuring his nomination or election as United States senator. A Michigan statute prohibited the expenditure of more than twenty-five per cent of one year's compensation to procure the nomination for any office, and a like limitation in procuring one's election. Senator Newberry was charged with a conspiracy to violate this law by an expenditure of more than one hundred thousand dollars to procure his nomination as United States senator on the Republican ticket in the state of Michigan. Reversing a judgment of conviction, the Supreme Court held that the power given to Congress by Art. I, Sec. 4, to regulate the manner of holding elections for United States senators did not give Congress power to regulate primaries for the purpose of selecting candidates for United States senators to be placed on the respective

party tickets at the ensuing election. On this point Justice McReynolds, writing the opinion of the Court, said:

"If it be practically true that under present conditions a designated party candidate is necessary for an election—a preliminary thereto—nevertheless his selection is in no real sense part of the manner of holding the election. This does not depend upon the scheme by which candidates are put forward. Whether the candidate be offered through primary, or convention, or petition, or request of a few, or as the result of his own unsupported ambition does not directly affect the manner of holding the election. Birth must precede, but it is no part of either funeral or apotheosis.

"Many things are prerequisites to elections or may affect their outcome—voters, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, immigration, private animosities, even the face and figure of the candidate; but authority to regulate the manner of holding them gives no right to control any of these. It is settled, e. g., that the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce does not reach whatever is essential thereto. Without agriculture, manufacture, mining, etc., commerce could not exist, but this fact does not suffice to subject them to the control of Congress. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346.

"We cannot conclude that authority to control party primaries or conventions for designating candidates was bestowed on Congress by the grant of power to regulate the manner of holding elections. The fair intendment of the words does not extend so far; the framers of the Constitution did not ascribe to them any such meaning. Nor is this control necessary in order to effectuate the power expressly granted. On the other hand, its exercise would interfere with purely domestic affairs of the state and infringe upon liberties reserved to the people."

No line of decisions is more discreditable to the judiciary of this country than those holding that primary elections are not "elections" within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution of the various states. Special mention is due the great courts of Illinois, Indiana and Pennsylvania for taking the sensible ground that under our present form of party government, a primary is as much an election as is the final choice made between rival party candidates. People v. Chicago Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321; State v. Hirsch, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. 1062, 9 L. R. A. 170; Leonard v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. 607, 4 Atl. 220; People v. Dineen, 247 Ill. 289, 93 N. E. 437. The Constitution of the United States is a document couched in most general terms, to abide for all time, and it would be a reflection on the intelligence of the framers of the instrument to presume that they did not have in mind the possibility of any future changes in the manner of holding elections and selecting candidates. When the Constitution provides that Congress may regulate the "manner" of holding elections for senators and representatives, it has in view every step which should become a necessary and integral part of the plan by which such persons are elected to office. On this point the dissenting opinion of Justice Pitney is interesting. The learned Justice said:

"Why should this provision of the Constitution—so vital to the very structure of the government—be so narrowly construed? It is said primaries were unknown when the Constitution was adopted. So were the steam railway and the electric telegraph. But the authority of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states was extended over these instrumentalities, because it was recognized that the manner of conducting the commerce was not essential. And this court was prompt to recognize that a transportation of merchandise, incidentally interrupted for a temporary purpose, or proceeding under successive bills of lading or means of transport, some operating wholly intrastate, was none the less interstate commerce, if such commerce was the practical and essential result of all that was done."

We are not interested in the result in the particular case. In fact, we believe, with the four dissenting judges, that the conviction should have been reversed on the ground that the Federal Corrupt Practice Act did not intend to limit spontaneous contributions of money by others than the candidate except as he should participate therein. But we do object to the ground of this decision and fear that it will greatly restrict the power of Congress to safeguard the election of United States senators. The whole country is interested in the election of a Senate that will represent the free choice of the people and be wholly free from the domination of men of wealth and commercial influence. It is idle to say that the election and not the primary is the place where this selection is made. Under our present form of party government a United States senator is selected at the respective primaries. No man could hope for election, in most cases, who failed to secure a nomination of one of the great parties. To say that Congress cannot regulate the primaries at which United States Senators are chosen is to put Congress under the domination of the states in respect of a matter which vitally concerns the national interests. For what avails it to regulate elections when the real choice is made at a primary?

We are pleased to note that Justice McKenna concurs in the opinion of the majority only so far as the present statute is concerned, reserving his opinion as to the constitutionality of a statute passed under the power of the Seven-

teenth Amendment. The Corrupt Practice Act was enacted prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, which gave to the people the power to choose United States senators. Under this amendment and the doctrine of implied powers, such an act, it seems to us, would clearly be constitutional.

CONTRACTING OUT.

During the war the well tried and time honoured principle of English law, freedom of contract, has not received its customary effect. The reasons given for interfering with it are various, such as (1) National defense and security; (2) Impossibility of performance arising from war conditions, and (3) Reasons of public policy. We are inclined to think that the effect on the country of these experiments has been such as to cause a reaction in favour of the principles which lie at the root of the great doctrine of freedom of contract.

In one department, that of the law of landlord and tenant, the interference has been most extensive. By a series of measures commencing in 1915, and now codified in one Act known as the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act 1920, the landlord of a dwelling house or of business premises cannot raise the rent nor can a mortgagee increase his rate of interest, except to an extent allowed by the statute. And so long as such rent and interest is paid the tenant cannot be dispossessed, nor the mortgage called in.

By far the most important decision yet given on the Rent, etc., Restrictions Act, 1920, is that of the Court of Appeal in *Barton & Mitchell v. Fincham* (Times, 9th February). It practically decides that contracting out is not allowable. The ground of decision briefly is that Section 5 of the statute places a clear restriction on the power of the Court to make an order for possession. This cannot be done save in a series of expressly excepted cases, and it follows that, for a landlord to obtain an order, he must bring himself within one of the excepted cases. This the plaintiffs in the case referred to had not done; the tenant's agreement to give up possession was not an excepted case; hence the Court had no jurisdiction to make an order for possession. The County Court Judge, in granting an order for possession, took the broad ground that the tenant had got twenty pounds as consideration for waiving her statutory rights, and was estopped from setting them up. On appeal this decision stood because the two judges in the Divisional Court, Lush, J., and MacCardie, J., took opposite views as to the law. Mr. Justice Lush was strongly of opinion that it was quite opposed to "public policy" to permit the parties, landlord and tenant, to contract out of the statutory protection afforded to the house. Mr. Justice MacCardie, on the other hand, after a most elaborate and learned analysis of the effect of public policy in the construction of numerous statutes, held that interference with freedom of contract is more opposed to public policy than the protection of tenants who surrender their tenancy for a consideration which they afterwards feel to be inadequate.

In the Court of Appeal all three judges were in agreement. The Court was a strong one, consisting of Lords Justices Bankes, Scrutton, and Atkin. The simple point taken by all the judges was that Section 5 has limited the jurisdiction of the Court to make orders for possession; it cannot make such orders at all except where the conditions precedent prescribed by that section are proved to its satisfaction. Therefore, the landlord and tenant cannot give it jurisdiction by contracting out of the statutory prohibition. This, as a ground of judgment is narrow, but incidentally, although not necessary to the judgment which reversed the Courts below and reinstated the tenant in possession of her house, each of the three learned judges indicated approval of the view that "contracting out" of the statute is opposed to public policy. Lord Justice Scrutton pointed out that, if

a landlord and tenant can contract out of the statute after the tenancy has come into existence, there seems no reason why they should not contract out of it before the tenancy comes into existence; the effect of which would be that, whenever a house became vacant, landlords would re-let only subject to a "contracting out" clause and so exclude all future tenants from the benefits of statutory protection.

It will be seen that in the Court of Appeal the judges did not face the general question of the competency of contracting out as the Divisional Court judges did. The broad rule of our law is that it is competent to contract out of a statute unless the statute itself contains a prohibition against contracting out. Examples of such statutory prohibition are to be found in the Employers' Liability Acts and the Agricultural Holdings Act. The importance of the decision we are reviewing is that in effect it prohibits contracting out in regard to a statute, which in terms does not prohibit it. The decision, too, raises the question whether our Courts are becoming less careful of preserving the privilege of contracting out than they have hitherto been. Jessel, M. R., in a well-known passage in one of his judgments put the reason for the Court preferring freedom of contract on the ground of public policy. He held that there is a paramount public policy not lightly to interfere with the freedom of contract; this paramount policy must outweigh all except the gravest and most undisputable of lesser public policies to the contrary. "If there is one thing," he said, "which more than another, public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice. Therefore you have this paramount public policy to consider—you must not interfere lightly with freedom of contract."

The purpose of the law is to impart stability and security to business relationships. The essential nature of the transaction termed "contract" is thus well described by one writer on jurisprudence, Mr. Sheldon Amos:

"In every case of a contract between two persons, one of them, at the least, binds his acts in the future, and the other knows that he does so and directs his own conduct in accordacne with that knowledge. For the person so relying upon the other's future action, so much at least of the cloud of uncertainty that ever hangs over the future is lifted. For the vacillation and changeableness of human action and will, the certainty of a sequence is substituted. The person who thus engages to bind his own future may be induced to do so by a variety of different considerations. He may be induced to make the engagement by way of reward for a service already rendered him, or by way of reciprocity as the price of some service done or gift presented at the time, or as the price of some service to be done in the future."

These words reveal the primary and essential importance of contract, namely, security and stability; and a consideration of them will, we think, lead to the conviction that the less interference by the state in the matter the better; rather, encouragement of freedom of contract should be aimed at.

DONALD MACKAY.

Glasgow, Scotland.

IS THERE A RESURRECTION AT THE BAR?

Mr. J. H. Balfour Browne, K. C., wrote an interesting book entitled, "Forty Years at the Bar." He practiced as a barrister in London at the Parliamentary bar and specialized in compensation-condemnation-cases. What impressed me forcibly while reading this book was the following statement: "I am of the opinion that there is no resurrection at the bar."[1] Browne refers to distinguished practitioners who accepted political preferment and then re-

(1) Forty Years at the Bar, p. 169.

turned to, or rather attempted to re-enter active practice; but, in his opinion, success is highly problematical, at least at the British bar.

Recently, the press announced that ex-President Wilson would enter upon the practice of law; and that the legislature of New York had granted him the right to practice in the courts of that state. The State of Washington could not be so generous for our constitution prohibits special legislation. Lawyers cannot be admitted here except as provided by general statute.

The question has often been asked: "What shall we do with our ex-presidents?" As most ex-presidents at the expiration of their term of office have reached the age of sixty years, it would seem that a dignified retirement would be most appropriate after holding that exalted position. The Constitution[2] makes the President the Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. An easy solution would be to place him at the end of his service upon the retired list as an army officer and on retirement pay, equal to the president's allowance.

In glancing over the occupants of the presidential chair one is reminded that twenty-two out of twenty-eight were admitted to the bar. Of these, three were lawyers of first rank: John Adams, Abraham Lincoln and Benjamin Harrison. That is, these names would be found in a book of great lawyers, if they had never occupied the presidency. Only one of them returned to practice—Benjamin Harrison. Grover Cleveland was an excellent president, although he did not rank high as a lawyer, but his reputation as an executive has been growing as his administration is being viewed free from party prejudice. After his first term he became a member of a New York firm headed by the late Francis Lynde Stetson. Benjamin Harrison often appeared in court after he left the White House, and distinguished himself by his lawyer-like arguments.

(2) Art. 2. Sect. 2.

Whether Lincoln was really a great lawyer depends upon the viewpoint; althought he has a place in "Great American Lawyers."[3] By the Bar he is regarded rather as a lawyer-orator like Patrick Henry, Henry Clay, Robert G. Ingersoll and Roscoe Conkling; and yet the last was offered the appointment of Chief Justice by President Grant, and Associate Justice by President Arthur, both of which he declined. It is stated that James K. Polk was engaged in the trial of a case before a justice of the peace at Nashville, when notified that he had been nominated for president. That was nothing derogatory to a candidate for the presidency, but if it happened at the present day it would seem somewhat remarkable.

Times have changed in other respects. In 1820 Daniel Webster would charge $20.00 for an opinion in important cases, and $100.00 for an annual retainer.[4] Recently a judge in a New York court allowed $45,000 for preliminary counsel fees in defending an action for divorce. Of course, the defendant was rated as a multi-millionaire, and the judge found it easy to be the liberal dispenser of another's money.

There is no doubt, however, that lawyers who abandoned their practice for political office have, as a rule, had difficulty in ever regaining their former prestige at the bar. Webster and Choate were in the senate, but they were continually in court while serving as senators. Matthew H. Carpenter and Roscoe Conkling did the same. In 1893 a receivership case was pending in the United States Circuit Court at Seattle concerning the Northern Pacific Railroad. There was a noted array of counsel present at the hearing. Senators Spooner of Wisconsin, Manderson of Nebraska, Sanders of Montana, and Dolph and Mitchell of Oregon participated in the

(3) Vol. 5, p. 461.

(4) Clark's Eminent Lawyers, Vol. 2, p. 857.

argument, although the law phase of the case was more ably presented by other counsel who held no political office.

Congress, no doubt, felt that the appearance of Senators and Representatives in court and before government departments, had a tendency to reflect upon its dignity, enacted a statute on June 11, 1864,[5] prohibiting any of its members from appearing in any cause before the departments. Senator Mitchell was convicted under this statute, as was Senator Burton of Kansas.[6] Like many other enactments this law was regarded obsolete until President Roosevelt urged these prosecutions, which brought the statute into prominence, and it seems to have been strictly observed since. These Senators happened to be the victims of a custom that had been followed for years, but the effect was decisive in eliminating Senators and Representatives from practicing before the departments, and apparently before the courts as well.

Reverting to our theme of resurrection at the bar, there are some noted instances of success which are probably exceptions to prove the rule. In March 1857, the celebrated Dred Scott case was decided by a divided court.[7] Benjamin R. Curtis was one of the ablest judges ever on the Supreme bench. He wrote a dissenting opinion. Later in that case Chief Justice Taney and Justice Curtis became involved in an acrimonious controversy because of changes made by the Chief Justice after filing the original official opinion by inserting eighteen pages to answer the views of Justice Curtis.[8] Justice Curtis resigned after six years of service. Returning to Boston he entered upon a lucrative practice which averaged over $40,000 a year for seventeen years.[9] In 1868 he refused the appointment of Attorney General of the United States, and in 1871 declined to act as counsel for this government in the Geneva Arbitration case, because he disliked public office and did not want to neglect his law practice.

Contemporaneous with Curtis in the Supreme Court was John A. Campbell who was appointed in 1852 and resigned in 1861, because he believed a state had a right to secede, and as Alabama seceded, he, of course, followed the fortunes of that commonwealth. Justice Wayne held the contrary view and refused to follow Georgia, but continued on the Supreme bench to 1865. Justice Campbell also wrote a dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case. After the Civil War he carried on an extensive practice, appearing in the Slaughter House Cases,[10] and many others, as may be seen from an interesting biography of Campbell by Henry G. Connor, United States District Judge in North Carolina. He attained great eminence at the bar, living to March 12, 1889; and had the honor of being the last survivor of the distinguished court over which Chief Justice Taney presided. Had he continued on the Supreme bench to the end of his days he would have served thirty-seven years, a longer time than any Justice of that court. Curtis and Campbell were great jurists and intimate friends. They, however, represented the extreme views on constitutional rights in their day; one as asserted in the North, the other as contended for in the South.

Judge P. Benjamin was a brilliant lawyer. He was a United States Senator but resigned in 1861. He had a very extensive practice in New Orleans, but owing to business reverses he lost most of his property, and the war swept away the re-

(5) Sect. 1782 U. S. Stat. 1901.

(6) Burton v. U. S. 196, U. S. 283.

(7) Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393.

(8) The Supreme Court, by Hampton L. Carson, Vol. 2, p. 349.

(9) Life of Curtis, 268.

(10) 16 Wall. 36, New Orleans v. Gaines, 131 U. S. 191.

mainder. He was respectively Attorney General, Secretary of War and of State for the confederacy. Rather than return to Louisiana to practice he determined to seek his fortune in a foreign land, and on January 12, 1866, he was entered at Lincoln's Inn, London, age 55 years, to begin anew a legal career at the bottom of the aristocratic and conservative Bar of England. It should be remembered that Benjamin was born in the Island of St. Thomas, W. I., and therefore, regarded as a British subject, which greatly favored him, so that he was called to the bar in June, 1866. While preparing for admission he wrote "Benjamin on Sales," published in 1868, a classic to this day. He became a Q. C. in 1871, but retired in 1883. His income exceeded $75,000 a year, which would apparently refute Mr. Browne's assertion that there is no come-back at the bar. However, Judah P. Benjamin was a remarkable exception to the general run of gifted men. Of all the biographies in the eight volumes of "Great American Lawyers," the career of Mr. Benjamin is most fascinating to me, because of his determination, his patience and wonderful industry and perseverance, crowned with unparalleled success as a practitioner, first at the American and then at the British bar. His professional life should serve as a constant inspiration for lawyers at all times.

The Pacific Northwest embraces a territory larger than the original thirteen states, and in potential wealth and resources surpasses imagination; yet we have never had representation in the United States Supreme Court. George H. Williams was probably the greatest lawyer this region ever produced. He was admitted to the bar in Iowa in 1844, and was Chief Justice of Oregon Territory in 1853; later a United States Senator from that state. Then he became Attorney General under President Grant, who nominated him for Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1874 to succeed Salmon P. Chase. It seems that Mrs. Williams was diplomatically speaking, *persona non grata* to the women of the Supreme Court circle, consequently the nomination was not confirmed. He returned to Portland, Oregon, and practiced law very successfully until he died in 1910. Had he been confirmed and served to the time of his death he would have exceeded John Marshall in length of service as Chief Justice as well as every other member of that court.

From what has been stated it may be concluded that there is "a resurrection at the bar," both in this country and in England, but there is no doubt that it takes extraordinary perseverance and unusual ability to break the rule. Generally speaking, ex-congressmen and other governmental officials of high rank have great difficulty in regaining prestige in a most exacting profession—the law. The really great lawyers like Charles O'Connor, Jeremiah S. Black, Reverdy Johnson, David Dudley Field and many others have held aloof from a political career. In England it is the unwritten law that a Lord Chancellor or a Lord Chief Justice never returns to the bar as a practitioner.[11] Lord Erskine chafed under this restriction, for he lived sixteen years after leaving the woolsack, and longed to re-enter the arena of forensic practice, where he had won undying fame as the most eloquent and fearless British advocate.

As to Mr. Wilson, every member of the legal fraternity will consider it flattering to our profession that an ex-president after serving this great nation for eight years should have the desire and ambition to be again enrolled as an ordinary member of our bar; and as such every lawyer will wish him the best of health and, what is most gratifying to any of us—well-merited success.

FRED H. PETERSON.

Seattle, Wash.

(11) Vol. 1 Erskine's Speeches, p. 18.

NEGLIGENCE — LIABILITY OF WATER COMPANY.

TRUSTEES OF JENNIE DEPAUW MEMORIAL METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. NEW ALBANY WATERWORKS.

130 N. E. 827.

(Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. April 21, 1921.)

A water company which had agreed in its contract with city to keep fire hydrants in repair and furnish sufficient water to put out fires, but which surrendered its franchise from the city and received in lieu thereof an indeterminate permit as provided in Acts 1913, p. 167, § 101 (Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 10052x3), was liable to a church under Public Service Act, §§ 7 and 116, for loss by fire occasioned by defective condition of a fire hydrant, which condition existed by reason of the water company's negligent failure to keep it in proper order, the word "injured" in the last-named section meaning any wrong or damage done to a man's person, rights, reputation, or goods, including privation of a legal right; and such section created a liability in favor of the individual injured which did not theretofore exist.

NICHOLS, J. Action by appellant against appellee to recover for the loss and damage sustained by appellant on account of fire resulting from appellee's negligence. The complaint was in two paragraphs to each of which a demurrer was sustained. Appellant refused to plead further and elected to stand upon the complaint, and judgment was rendered against appellant for costs. From this judgment, this appeal.

The substantial averments of the complaint, so far as herein involved, are as follows: Appellant was on December 20, 1917, the owner of certain real estate in the city of New Albany, Floyd county, Ind., upon which was situated a stone church, the property of appellant, of the reasonable value of $20,000. In such church appellant had personal property of the total value of $4,000. Appellee at said time owned and operated, and for 14 years theretofore had owned and operated, in said city a system of waterworks for the purposes of supplying said city and its hydrants with water for fire protection, and for municipal and domestic purposes. On August 25, 1904, appellee entered into a certain contract in the nature of a franchise with said city, by the terms of which appellee was permitted and authorized to erect and maintain in said city its said waterworks for the purposes aforesaid, by which said contract appellee agreed to furnish an adequat supply of water to said city for protection of the property of said city and its inhabitants against fire. The contract covered a period of 25 years. It provided that appellee should furnish at its own cost and expense 200 fire hydrants at points then located, or to be thereafter located, by the city. Such hydrants were to be kept in good order and working condition, and were to be used by said city through its fire department for the purposes of extinguishing fires in said city. Such water system was to be so constructed and the hydrants kept in such condition that during the prevalence of fire the water supply should be sufficient for the purposes of extinguishing such fires. The city agreed to pay the said company for such purposes the sum of $60 per annum for the first 200 hydrants and $50 per annum for each additional hydrant over 200; the funds for such purposes to be paid out of the public revenue of such city raised by taxation of the property of said city and otherwise. After such contract was entered into, appellee did maintain in said city its system of waterworks in such contract provided for, and for the purposes therein contemplated. One of said hydrants was located on Vincennes street in said city and immediately in front of appellant's said property, which said hydrant was the nearest fire hydrant to said property. Appellee maintained said system under the terms of said contract for the purposes therein contemplated until June 25, 1917; its only right to maintain said waterworks being under the terms of said contract. On said June 25, 1917, pursuant to the provisions of section 101 of the act of the General Assembly concerning public utilities, approved March 4, 1913 (see Acts 1913, p. 167; section 10052x3, Burns' R. S. 1914), appellee filed with the clerk of said city, and with the Public Service Commission of Indiana, a written declaration legally adopted and executed by appellee to the effect that it surrendered said franchise so received from said city as aforesaid, and that it received by operation of law in lieu thereof an indeterminate permit as provided for in said act, and appellee did so surrender its franchise as aforesaid, and since June 25, 1917, appellee has been operating its water system in said city, and furnishing water to said city and its inhabitants for the purposes aforesaid, and has been maintaining its fire hydrants, including the said fire hydrant in front of appellant's property, all under its said permit. Said city has during all of said time maintained its fire department adequately equipped for the pur-

poses of fighting and extinguishing fires occurring in said city with water so contracted to be furnished to such city by appellee from the hydrants aforesaid. Said hydrant in front of appellant's property was so located that the hose of such department could be attached to it, and in a few seconds' time water could be thrown in or on any fire that might occur in appellant's property, and such fire extinguished, if such hydrant had been maintained in proper repair and working condition. But on said December 30, 1917, in violation of said indeterminate permit, appellee did not furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities, in this, that it negligently and carelessly suffered and permitted the said fire hydrant to become out of order and repair, and that water would not flow through it into the hose of the fire department, and that said hydrant could not be turned on or opened so that water would flow from the mains into the hose when attached thereto. Immediately upon the occurrence of the fire the fire department was notified and responded with the necessary hose and apparatus for extinguishing such fire, and attached its hose to said hydrant and attempted to open the same, and to obtain water therefrom, but was unable so to obtain it, and for that reason to extinguish the fire. At said time the fire was still in its incipiency, and could and would have been extinguished except for the defective condition of the hydrant aforesaid. Said building and its contents were totally destroyed, to the appellant's damage in the sum of $25,000, solely by the negligence of appellee as aforesaid.

Each of the rulings on said demurrers present the same questions so far as this appeal is concerned, and it is therefore unnecessary to set out the substance of the second paragraph of complaint.

It is to be observed that prior to June 25, 1917, being the date when appellee surrendered its franchise to said city and received its indeterminate permit to operate under the Public Utilities Act, appellee had been furnishing water to said city and to its inhabitants for fire protection under the terms and stipulations of such franchise, and that after it was granted such indeterminate permit it continued to furnish such service under the provisions of said Public Utilities Act, and that it has been acting and furnishing water to said city and its inhabitants for said purposes under said permit since June 25, 1917, and that it was so acting under said permit at the time of the fire here involved. Appellant conceded that under the common law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of this state, as well as by the court of other jurisdictions, there was no liability to the individual citizen of the municipality, for the reason that there was no privity of relation between such citizen and such public service corporation. Appellant cites Fitch v. Seymour Water Co., 139 Ind. 214, 37 N. E. 982, 47 Am. St. Rep. 258, as an authority sustaining this proposition against appellant, and appellee relies upon such authority, together with many others both in and out of the state, which it cites. It is therefore taken for granted that the question of the common-law liability is not involved in this action, and appellant's liability, if any, must be determined by an examination and interpretation of the provisions of the Public Service Act. Acts 1913, p. 167; Burns' R. S. 1914, § 10052a et seq.

Section 101 of said act provides:

"Any public utility operating under an existing license, permit or franchise shall, upon filing at any time prior to the expiration of such license, permit or franchise and prior to July 1, 1915, with the clerk of the municipality which granted such franchise and with the Commission, a written declaration, legally executed, that it surrenders such license, permit or franchise, receive by operation of law, in lieu thereof an indeterminate permit as provided in this act, and such public utility shall hold such permit under all the terms, conditions and limitations of this act."

Section 7 of such act provides that every public utility is required to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities.

Section 116 thereof provides:

"If any public utility shall do or cause to be done or permit to be done any matter, act or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done by this act such public utility shall be liable to the person, firm or corporation injured thereby in the amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation."

Section 110 thereof provides that the municipality shall have the power to determine by contract, ordinance, or otherwise the quality and character of the service to be furnished or rendered by the public utility furnishing such service and the terms and conditions not inconsistent with the Public Service Act. It does not appear, however, by the complaint that any change was made in the kind and quality of service to be rendered after the surrender of the franchise and the granting of the indeterminate permit.

It will be observed that the hydrant here involved had been located immediately across the street from appellant's property during the time that appellee was operating under its franchise with said city, and that the same continued to remain in such location to the time

of the fire. It is averred in the complaint that such hydrant was out of order and repair because of the negligence and carelessness of appellee, and for that reason water would not flow from the mains through it into the fire department's hose, and that such negligence thereby resulted in the damages complained of by appellant.

It must be kept in mind that appellee after June 25, 1917, was not rendering service to the city of New Albany and its inhabitants for fire protection and otherwise under the franchise of said city which it theretofore held, but that it was furnishing such service thereafter wholly under the terms and conditions of the Public Utilities Act, and subject to the duties and liabilities imposed by such act.

It is contended by appellee that the Public Service Law does not provide for any liability of a public utility that did not exist prior to its enactment, while it is contended by appellant that by the passage of said act Indiana has fundamentally changed the law governing public service corporations, and that under such act the management and control of such corporations has been taken over by the state, and by statutory enactment the state has determined the obligations, duties, rights, and liabilities of such corporations, not only to the state and the municipality in which they operate, but to the general public and the individual intended to be served by such public service corporation, and that by such enactment a liability has been created where none theretofore existed.

Reading section 7 and section 116, referred to above, we have the express provision that every public utility is required to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities, and that, failing and omitting so to do, such public utility shall be liable to the person, firm, or corporation injured thereby for the amount of damages sustained consequential to such violation. Recognizing, as we must, that before the passage of such Public Service Act there was no liability on the part of the public service utility to an inhabitant of a city within which such corporation was operating under a franchise for injuries suffered by such inhabitant because of the negligent acts of such public service utility, we are wholly unable to interpret the sections aforesaid of the Public Service Act so as to make them simply an enactment of the common-law principle theretofore established, and by such interpretation thereby make the provisions aforesaid an absolute nullity. By the use of language so plain of understanding and so easy of interpretation, we must hold that the Legislature intended thereby to change the law so as to create a liability that did not theretofore exist, and it has created a liability in favor of the individual injured because of the negligence of such public service utility in failing to furnish reasonably adequate service of water for fire protection.

Sections 7 and 116 of the Public Service Act, the provisions of which are given above, are substantially copied from corresponding sections of the Public Service Act of the state of Wisconsin, except that the section of the Wisconsin act corresponding to section 116 of the Indiana act provides for treble damages.

On February 28, 1913, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the case of Krom v. Antigo Gas Co., 154 Wis. 528, 140 N. W. 41, places upon the section corresponding to said section 116 of the Indiana act a construction to the effect that the treble damage feature of such section indicated that the section was intended to be penal, and hence covered only willful breaches of duty, or, as expressed in the case of Cohn v. Neeves, 40 Wis. 393, a breach in which there is some element of willfulness, wantonness, or evil design. It will be observed that the Indiana act omits the word "treble," thereby making the trespassing corporation liable to the person, firm or corporation injured only in the amount of damages sustained in consequence of its violation of the law. The time intervening between the date that this decision was handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the date of the approval of the Public Service Act of Indiana is so short that it is questionable as to whether such decision was of controlling force in inducing the change that was made in the Indiana statute. Whether such was the case or not, we think it apparent that the change in the Indiana statute was such as to take out of it the punitive element making the liability of the trespassing corporation for compensatory damages only. Though such section of the Wisconsin act was by such decision held to be punitive, and therefore only applying to cases of willful injury, and such holding is for the Wisconsin court, we hold that the change in such section as enacted by the Indiana Legislature is such as to extend the liability of the public service corporation to injuries resulting from its negligence, and the question of its negligence in a particular case is one of fact for the jury. After re-argument the opinion in the case of Krom v. Antigo Gas Co., supra, was modified, and the modified opinion is reported in 154 Wis. 528, 143 N. W. 163. In such modified opinion the court says that

it is not convinced of error in the result which was reached in the first opinion, but is convinced of its error in some of the reasoning by which it reached such result. In the second opinion the court says that in the first opinion the word "injury" was said to carry no necessary implication of actionable wrong, while in the modified opinion the court says that—

"The word 'injure' in its accurate and technical legal sense means to violate a legal right of another, or, what amounts to the same thing, to inflict an actionable wrong. * * * Now, if the word 'injured' is used in its accurate legal sense * * * then no new liability is created by that section (except the liability for treble damages instead of single damages)."

We have thus quoted from the modified opinion of the Wisconsin decision for the purpose of showing the process of reasoning by which the court in the modified opinion reached the conclusion that the section involved created no new liability except for treble damages. We deem it unnecessary further to discuss such modified opinion, except to suggest the probability that the influence that was controlling therein was, as expressed, to the effect that immense sums had been invested in public utilities of this nature in undoubted reliance upon the common-law principle of non-liability, and that tremendous liabilities would be imposed on water companies and cities operating their own plant as well, if the law were construed as the plaintiff contended that it should be construed.

In the case of Boyer v. State, 169 Ind. 691, 83 N. E. 350, it was held that, when there is nothing in the act itself to indicate that the word or phrase is used in a particular or technical sense, it will be construed in its ordinary and popular meaning, unless the result would be to defeat the legislative intent. "Injury" means, in general any wrong or damage done to a man's person, rights, reputation or goods. "Injured," in its plain, ordinary, and usual sense, signifies privation of a legal right. Jordan v. State, 142 Ind. 422, 427, 41 N. E. 817. These definitions answer our purpose in this case. Certainly appellants had a legal right to fire protection.

The ordinary legislator, whether he be a carpenter or miner, farmer or merchant, lawyer or judge, whatever may be his business or occupation, would certainly have no difficulty in understanding the plain, ordinary meaning of the section of the statute which says that—

"If any public utility * * * shall omit to do any act, matter or thing required to be done by this act such public service utility shall be liable to the person, firm or corporation injured thereby in the amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation."

The language is so plain that it needs no interpretation, and, when such public utility negligently fails to furnish reasonable and adequate service and facilities for protection against fire, its liability must be measured by the plain, ordinary language of said section above quoted. We hold that it was error to sustain the respective demurrers to the several paragraphs of the complaint, and the judgment is therefore reversed, with instructions to the trial court to overrule each of such demurrers and for further proceedings.

NOTE.—*Liability of Water Company for Loss by Fire Due to Inadequate Supply or Facilities.*—Aside from statutory provision creating such liability, it is held that there is no liability on the part of a water company, under contract with a city to furnish water for a waterworks system, for fire losses due to lack of or insufficient water supply. This rule applies to a city which has undertaken to protect against fires by installing waterworks system and a fire department. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co., Wis., 168 N. W. 199; McQuillin, Mun. Corp., § 2680.

"In the creation of a system of waterworks and the operation of the same for the purpose of protection against fire, flushing sewers, and other uses pertaining to the public health and safety, the city is in the exercise of the police power and is therefore exercising a governmental function." Eastern Ill. State Normal v. Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, 111 N. E. 573; McQuillin, Mun. Corp., § 2625.

In North Carolina, however, we find the following: "Where a citizen of a town has brought suit against the receiver of a water company for the alleged negligent failure of the water company to supply water under its contract with the city, by reason of which the plaintiff sustained loss by fire, and the plaintiff has collected moneys due under his policies with certain insurance companies on the same building insufficient to pay the damages he has sustained, and it appears that the receiver has sufficient funds. Held, the insurance companies subrogated to the rights of the insured, and in this case the order of the Superior Court is sustained, that the insurance companies have made out a *prima facie* case against the receiver of the insolvent water company, and that they be permitted to sue him." Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426.

BOOK RECEIVED.

Pocket Manual of Standard and Business Forms, Annotated. For all business, corporate and legal transactions, with explanations and citations, including synopses of the law of Acknowledgments, Agency, Assignments, Contracts, Copyrights, Negotiable Instruments, Patents, Sales, Trade-Marks, etc. By Leslie M. O'Connor, of the Chicago Bar. Chicago. 1921.

BOOK REVIEW.

CORPUS JURIS—VOLUME 23.

Volume 23 of Corpus Juris completes the subject of Evidence, which was begun in Volume 22. The treatment makes this an exceptionally valuable text book on the law of Evidence.

This volume also contains a discussion of the subject of Exchange of Property, covering 58 pages; Executions, covering 679 pages; Executors and Administrators, covering 222 pages.

The article on Executors and Administrators is by Joseph Walker Magrauth; it will be completed in Volume 24. It is a very valuable treatment of the subject by reason of the careful analyses of the decisions and their classifications according to the facts of each case.

It is a pleasure to note that the workmanship of these later volumes of Corpus Juris is on a par with that of the earlier volumes, giving promise that this set of encyclopedia will long remain the greatest of them all.

Bound in one volume of 1206 pages.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

"I claim that congressmen are paid more than they're worth."

"How much are they paid?"

"I don't know."—*Nashville Tennessean.*

A lawyer, in some ways grass green,
Quite incautiously filled his machine
By the light of a lamp
Where the breezes did ramp,
Since which time he has never benzine.

"How did Dubbs become a millionaire so quickly?"

"He's an importer."

"From Europe?"

"Nope, from Canada."—*American Legion Weekly.*

An attorney was examining a witness concerning the character of the dead man connected with the case, and the witness said:

"He was a man without blame, beloved and respected by all, pure in all his thoughts, and—"

"How did you learn all that?" interrupted the judge.

"I read it on his tombstone," the witness replied.

Willie. Paw, can you name six noted legislative bodies?

Paw. Well, there's the American Congress and the British Parliament and the French Chamber of Deputies and the German Reischstag and the Japanese Diet, my son.

Willie. But that's only five, and the teacher want us to name six.

Paw. Well, there's the—er—er—the Hungarian Goulash. Now, don't bother me. Can't you see I'm reading?—*Brooklyn Eagle.*

The youthful Lord Chancellor of England, in a recent case, admitted that neither he nor the House of Lords assumed to know all the law and must depend largely on the researches of counsel. Law Notes (London) has a poetical brainstorm over the incident with the following result:

When I went to the Bar as a very young man,
(Said I to myself—said I),
I'll master the law if any one can
(Said I to myself—said I)!

During an address to a body of law students, ex-President Taft pointed out that too much care cannot be taken in the selection of the jury. And in this connection he told of an intelligent looking farmer who had been examined by both defense and prosecution and was about to be accepted when the prosecutor chanced to ask:

"Do you believe in capital punishment?"

The farmer hemmed and hawed and after a moment's reflection replied:

"Yes, sir; I do, if it ain't too severe."—*St. Louis Star.*

One speaker had taken up nearly all the time assigned to three speakers. The first speaker to follow the long-winded one said:

"Mr. Longwynde's speech reminds me of the man who used to become spifficated and then buy his wife a present to take home as a peace offering. These purchases, being made while the man was under the befuddling influence, were sometimes wonders of eccentricity. On one occasion he took home a whole bolt of cheesecloth, saying: 'Jush lookit that, honey, wottigotchy!'

"The wife looked at the goods, unrolled a bit of it and said:

"'Why it's so thin, it's of no use!'

"'Yes,' said the intoxicated husband, 'but jush lookit how nice an' long it is!'"

WEEKLY DIGEST.

Weekly Digest of Important Opinions of the State Courts of Last Resort and of the Federal Courts.

Copy of Opinion in any case referred to in this digest may be procured by sending 25 cents to us or to the West Pub Co., St. Paul, Minn.

1. **Attachment** — Action for Tort. — Under Burns' Ann. St. Ind. 1914, § 947, authorizing attachments in "actions for the recovery of money," an attachment is authorized in tort actions for damages.—Shedd v. Calumet Const. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 270 Fed. 942.

2. **Attorney and Client**—Conveyance to Attorney.—Recording of a conveyance to an attorney of an interest in mineral rights, in consideration of his services to be rendered in protecting those rights, protects the interest of the attorney against a subsequent conveyance to the adverse party without his giving notice to the adverse party under Act No. 124 of 1906, relating to perfecting lien of attorneys, since the conveyance to the attorney was a present one, operative under registry laws regardless of lien statute.—McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., La., 87 So. 515.

3.——Disbarment.—Under Judiciary Law, § 88, subd. 3, and section 477, an attorney convicted of a violation of Criminal Code U. S. § 37 (U. S. Comp. St. § 10201), by conspiring to defraud the United States by hindering and delaying it in seizing title to an indebtedness to the Imperial German government during the war, a felony under Criminal Code U. S. § 335 (U. S. Comp. St. § 10509), must be disbarred, the provisions of the Judiciary Law being mandatory, subject to application for vacation of the order of disbarment if the conviction is reversed on appeal. —In re Lindheim, N. Y., 187 N. Y. S. 211.

4.——Fraudulent Opinion.—An opinion furnished prospective purchasers of land by attorneys held fraudulent, in the specific false statements as to the attorneys' opinion respecting the title, in the false inference intended to be thereby conveyed, and in essential matters concealed and withheld, which it was their duty to disclose.—Goodrich Lockhart Co. v. Sears, U. S. D. C., 270 Fed. 971.

5. **Bankruptcy**—Conditional Sale.—Under the law of Pennsylvania and Bankruptcy Act, § 47a (2), as amended by Act June 25, 1910, which vests a trustee with all the rights of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings, property held by a bankrupt under a conditional sale contract, and passing into the hands of his receiver, cannot be reclaimed by the seller.—In re Mina, U. S. D. C., 270 Fed. 969.

6.——Settlement Under Lease.—Where bankrupt, on leasing premises for a term at $75 per month, paid the landlord $225 as security for his performance of the contract, which sum, in his payment of rent to within 3 months of expiration of the term, was to be applied in payment of the remaining rent, and on the bankruptcy and vacation of the premises by the receiver the landlord accepted possession and rented to others, the receiver held entitled to recover the $225, less the rent due to the time he surrendered possession.—In re Tanory, U. S. D. C., 270 Fed. 872.

7.——Statute of Waste.—The New Jersey statute of waste, as construed by the courts of the state, while giving a remedy by an action on the case in the nature of waste founded on tort against certain classes of tenants, does not destroy the remedy by an action for waste founded on a covenant contained in the lease, and the judgment in such an action, although the claim was unliquidated at the time of the commission of an act of bankruptcy by the defendant, is provable under Bankruptcy Act, § 63a (Comp. St. § 9647[a]), and may be made the basis of a petition in bankruptcy.—In re Standard Aero Corporation of New York, U. S. C. C. A., 270 Fed. 779.

8. **Banks and Banking**—Cable Transmission. —Where national bank advertised that it sent money to Poland by cable at the "lowest prices," with "perfect security and speed guaranteed," and plaintiff paid $120 to the bank for cable transmission to Poland, an additional charge of $5 being made for a reply cable, he being orally told that in case of nonproduction of a receipt in three weeks the whole amount paid would be refunded, and it appeared that the money did not reach its destination, in an action by plaintiff to recover the money so paid, held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount paid.—Wasserman v. Irving Nat. Bank, N. Y., 187 N. Y. S. 243.

9.——Dishonored Check.—In depositor's action against bank for injury to credit from dishonor of checks, it was no defense that the bank's subordinates in dishonoring the checks had violated instructions.—Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat. Bank, N. Y., 130 N. E. 600.

10.——Note of Insolvent Bank.—An insolvent bank in the hands of a receiver was liable on notes executed by officers of the insolvent bank, payable to such bank, indorsed by it, and assigned to another bank for a valuable consideration.—Henderson v. Citizens' First Nat. Bank, Ga., 106 S. E. 549.

11.——Ultra Vires.—In lessor's action to recover premises leased to defendant's predecessor, held, that defendant bank could not, in view of Civ. Code, § 354, subd. 4, and the banking law, plead ultra vires as a defense against the recovery of rent on the ground that the bank did not have the right to operate a moving picture show, inasmuch as it could lawfully assume a lease, even though its use of the property might be ultra vires.—Chambers v. Security Commercial & Savings Bank, Cal., 196 Pac. 488.

12. **Bills and Notes**—Demand.—Where a demand note is payable generally and not at any particular place, no demand is necessary before commencing suit; the commencement of suit being a sufficient demand.—Arnott v. McClinock-Turnkey Co., Ind., 130 N. E. 436.

13. **Blasphemy** — What Constitutes Offense St. c. 126, § 30, may be committed either by using profanely insolent and reproachful language against God, or by contumeliously reproaching Him, His creation, government, final judgment of the world, Jesus Christ, the Holy Ghost, or the Holy Scriptures as contained in the canonical books of the Old and New Testament, or by exposing any of these enumerated Beings or Scriptures to contempt and ridicule,

and it is not necessary for the state to prove the doing of all of them.—State v. Mockus, Me., 113 Atl. 38.

14. **Broker's**—Dual Relation.—In broker's action against vendor for commission, failure of evidence to show plaintiff's bad faith or actual loss to his principal, flowing from his acceptance of compensation from the purchaser, does not prevent plaintiff's forfeiture of the agreed commission, since forfeiture follows the mere existence of the undisclosed dual relation, as the exaction of a sound public policy.—Paul v. Prince, Tex., 228 S. W. 1102.

15. **Carriers of Passengers** — Assault. — Custom not to open ticket window until 15 minutes before scheduled time for train, while evidential, was not controlling on question whether a person entering the station before such time and within a reasonable time before the departure of the train was a passenger in an action against the railroad for assault and battery.—Clark v. Bland, N. C., 130 S. E. 491.

16.——Correct Time.—A railroad was under no duty to furnish a clock in its waiting room for use of passengers at station, but, having undertaken to inform passengers the time by means of a clock in the waiting room, it was required to exercise due care in the maintenance thereof so that passengers would not miss train by reason of the clock being slow.—Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Clark, Ala., 87 So. 676.

17.——Degree of Care.—It is the duty of the operatives of a street car approaching a railroad crossing to use the highest degree of care to ascertain if there is any train closely approaching the crossing, to prevent injury to passengers on the street car.—Bergfeld v. Dunham, Mo., 228 S. W. 891.

18.——Degree of Care.—An instruction that "the degree of care that a carrier is required to take of a passenger does not mean that every possible or conceivable care and precaution which might increase or even assure the safety of the passenger must be taken, but only such care as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances," is misleading when standing alone, though it might be sanctioned if elucidating definition of due diligence.—Louisville & N. R Co. v. Holmes, Ala., 87 So. 574.

19.——Negligence.—A railroad passenger, arriving at the station of her destination, was entitled to the rights of a passenger while carefully leaving the train and platform.—Aldrich v. Boston & M. R. R., Mass., 130 N. E. 482.

20. **Charities**—Bequest to Fire Suppression Corporation.—Bequest to corporation organized under Laws 1873, c. 397, to aid in the suppression of fires in certain village held a charitable bequest in the broader sense of the term.—Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co. No. 2, N. Y., 130 N. E. 613.

21. **Covenants**—Recovery on Warranty.—The right of the vendee to recover on such warranty is not waived by going into possession of the land, with knowledge that the soil is impregnated with alkali to the extent mentioned in the warranty, or by cultivating the land or by making a cropping contract in regard to it.—Wilson v. Sunnyside Orchard Co., Idaho, 196 Pac. 302.

22. **Customs Duties**—Opium Not Merchandise.—Under Comp. St. §§ 8800, 8801, prohibiting the importation of opium prepared for smoking, such opium is not "merchandise," as defined by Rev. St. § 2766 (Comp. St. § 5462), since it cannot be lawfully imported, and therefore the master of a vessel is not liable for the penalty imposed by Rev. St. § 2809 (Comp. St. § 5506) on merchandise brought into the country without being shown on the vessel's manifest; the words "brought into," as used in section 2809, not having the effect of enlarging the definition of merchandise, contained in section 2766.—United States v. Sischo, U. S. C. C. A., 270 Fed. 958.

23. **Divorce**—Clean Hands.—Where plaintiff sued his wife for a divorce because she was addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors, which his own testimony shows that he knew before he married her, and also shows that he was so addicted to the use of liquor that he not only attempted suicide, but took treatments to get rid of the liquor habit, held, that the bill must be dismissed, because plaintiff had not come into court with clean hands.—Gill v. Gill, Mich., 181 N. W. 996.

24.——Cruel Treatment.—For a husband, two days after death of daughter, and when wife was ill, with a temperature of 103, to go to her room and abuse and criticize her and precipitate a family row about the wording of a telegram to him telling him of daughter's sickness, held cruel and inhuman treatment.—Hamilton v. Hamilton, Ore., 196 Pac. 472.

25. **Electricity**—Due Care.—An electric illuminating company, having placed its conduit in a public way, was bound thereafter to use due care in its maintenance, not only under the conditions of travel existing when the conduit was built, but coming into existence afterwards, whether by resurfacing or paving of the street, or the establishment of a car track.—Nugent v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., Mass., 130 N. E. 488.

26. **Eminent Domain**—Change of Grade.—Owner damaged by change of grade entitled to interest from time of change to time of payment.—Crane v. Craig, N. Y., 130 N. E. 609.

27.——Public Use.—Acts 1916, c. 71, in so far as it amends Acts 1906, c. 194 (Code 1919, § 3065, par. 2), authorizing city in street opening proceedings to acquire land in excess of that required and to replat and dispose of the excess in such manner as it may see fit, where such land is injuriously affected by the taking of a portion thereof for street purposes, held unconstitutional; the taking of such excess portion of the land not being for a "public use" within the Constitution limiting the taking or damaging of private property to a "public use."—City of Richmond v. Carneal, Va., 106 S. E. 403.

28. **Estoppel** — Additional Service. — Where a light and power company operating under a franchise covering night service had for more than 10 years also furnished day service, such fact held not to estop the company from denying that the franchise covered day service also, and the police power of the state as exercised through the State Corporation Commission could not be ousted by such an estoppel in pais operating on the parties.—City of Clifton Forge v. Virginia-Western Power Co., Va., 106 S. E. 400.

29.——Judicial Sale.—Where purchasers of lots sold separately at judicial sale were immediately informed by the commissioner that he would proceed to sell the lots together to which the parties' attorneys consented, although the judgment through error did not so provide and purchasers did not object, but one of them, for himself and the others, bid for the property as a whole, running up the price, and the curator of the defendant bid in the property, purchaser is estopped by his conduct from claiming title under the separate sale.—Crawley v. Manion, Ky., 228 S. W. 1032.

30. **Evidence**—Res Gestae.—A verbal lease, consummated on Sunday was void, under Code 1907, § 3346, but was admissible in an unlawful detainer action when undisputed, to prove the character and quality of defendant's possession of the premises, and the relations between defendant and plaintiff, and the intent of the parties, on the theory that its declarations or admissions formed a part of the res gestae of the parties' acts.—Eddins v. Galloway Coal Co., Ala., 87 So. 557.

31. **False Pretenses**—Knowledge of Fraud.—Defendant, charged with swindling by selling an 85-cent time check for $84.15, was not guilty if the prosecuting witness knew, when he parted with his money, that the check given him was for only 85 cents.—Scott v. State, Tex., 228 S. W. 1099.

32. **Homestead**—Community Property.—Wife is not a necessary party to an action against

husband to try the title to, affect an interest in, or foreclose a lien on community real estate, and in determining whether the wife's homestead interest alone renders her a necessary party to an action effecting property impressed with the homestead exemption, the test is whether the plea of homestead would in itself be a defense to the suit.—Cooley v. Miller, Tex., 228 S. W. 1085.

33. **Husband and Wife**—Agency of Necessity.—Where the husband and wife were separated and he was paying for her support, either as alimony under court order or in accordance with an agreement between them fixing such amount as adequate and satisfactory, the wife cannot pledge her husband's credit under the presumed authority of an agency of necessity. —McFerren v. Goldsmith-Stern Co., Md., 113 Atl. 107.

34. **Infants**—Information and Complaint.—Counts in information and complaint charging a felony were ineffective under the Juvenile Act where they did not specify that the party against whom they were filed was under 17 years of age.—Gordon v. State, Tex., 228 S. W. 1095.

35. **Insurance**—"Accidental Death."—There is a distinction between accidental death which may be an unexpected or unintentional result of a voluntary act, and death from accidental means, which must result from some unforeseen or unintended act.—United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum, U. S. C. C. A., 270 Fed. 947.

36.——Proof of Loss.—Though a fire policy provided that no condition could be waived unless such waiver was written upon or attached thereto, yet where the agents of the insurance company misled the insured, who furnished a written statement of his loss, into believing that no further proof was necessary, the insurance company cannot take advantage of the wrong, though it was that of its local agent and adjuster.—Walton v. American Cent. Ins. Co. of St. Louis, Wash., 196 Pac. 588.

37.——Surety Bond.—A bond given general agents for an insurance company by a soliciting agent the condition of which was that the soliciting agent should faithfully perform his duties as agent, account for and pay over all money received for the general agents or the company, and pay and discharge all indebtedness to the general agents and the company, did not impose on the sureties liability for moneys advanced to the soliciting agent by the general agents for living expenses.—Utter v. Leach, Mich., 181 N. W. 999.

38.——Windstorm.—A policy, agreeing to make good all immediate loss or damage to the property insured which should happen by windstorm, cyclone, and tornadoes, covered loss of a horse secured in the barn, when, terrified by the blowing in of a door, the horse broke its halter and forced its hind foot through the rear part of the stable, so that it could not extricate itself, and was injured so that it died from the injuries and exhaustion.—Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Anderson, Ind., 130 N. E. 419.

39. **Intoxicating Liquors**—Incomplete Process.—Law against "manufacture" of whisky violated, although process not completed.—People v. Nanninga, Mich., 181 N. W. 1014.

40.——Reputation of Place.—In a prosecution for maintaining a liquor nuisance and in prosecutions for the unlawful posession of intoxicating liquors with intent to sell, evidence of the general reputation of the place where such liquors are found is admissible in the first class of cases and under certain circumstances in the second class, provided the place be one of general resort or a public place fitted in the manner suitable to a liquor saloon.—Tindell v. State, Okla., 196 Pac. 555.

41. **Judgment**—Fraudulent Warrant of Attorney.—If a warrant of attorney in a promissory note was procured by fraud and false representations, it must necessarily follow that a judgment entered thereon solely by virtue of said warrant was without jurisdiction and void, and the validity of such judgments may be thus attacked in action thereon in another state.—Ashby v. Manley, Iowa, 181 N. W. 869.

42.——Specific Allegation.—The failure of the petition on an insurance policy to allege specifically that defendant was a corporation, though that fact was apparent from the face of the petition, does not make the petition so defective as to render the default judgment a nullity, where any defect in the service of summons, with which that allegation alone had to do, was waived by general appearance.—Brown v. British Dominions General Ins. Co., Mo., 228 S. W. 883.

43. **Landlord and Tenant**—Countermand of Order.—An order by landlord to tenant to vacate premises and a notice from tenant to landlord that he would do so did not constitute an eviction where landlord countermanded the order to vacate before tenant had moved.—Lawrence v. Rapaport, Mich., 181 N. W. 1011.

44.——Right of Recovery.—A landlord has no vested or contractual property right in any particular form of remedy for the recovery of his property so long as he is permitted effectively to recover possession of the property.—People v. La Fetra, N. Y., 130 N. E. 601.

45. **Libel and Slander**—Ineffectiveness.—That plaintiff's standing in the community had not been impaired by defendants' conduct, and that plaintiff could still show a good character, held not to exonerate defendants from their wrongful purpose, as this might tend to show a smaller injury actually sustained, but a greater damage really intended, and the malice, ill will, and spite of defendants were not per se reduced or mitigated by the meager results accomplished. —Cotton v. Fisheries Products Co., N. C., 130 S. E. 487.

46. **Life Estates**—Security.—Money, etc., should not be intrusted to life tenant without security, unless will so provides; life tenant held not entitled to possession without security, though remaindermen joined in her petition.—Barmore v. Gilbert, Ga., 106 S. E. 269.

47. **Mandamus**—Sheriff as Stakeholder.—Where the parties to an attachment suit agreed that the constable should sell the property and deliver the proceeds to the sheriff, to be held until final disposition of the case, the sheriff held the fund as a mere stakeholder, and, it not being his official duty to accept a replevy bond and pay over the fund to the defendant, he could not be required to do so by mandamus, under Civ. Code 1910, § 5440, authorizing mandamus to compel performance of official duties. —Hill v. Nixon, Ga., 106 S. E. 551.

48. **Master and Servant**—Accidental Injury.—Where a servant lifting a box weighing 700 pounds or more strained his left side and hernia resulted, there was an "accidental injury" within the meaning of Workmen's Compensation Law, §3, subd. 7.—Jordan v. Decorative Co., N. Y., 130 N. E. 634.

49.——Double Employment.—A plaintiff held entitled to recover compensation from a corporation for keeping its books, although he was at the same time employed as bookkeeper for another corporation, on a finding by the jury, supported by the evidence, that the double employment was with the knowledge and consent of both corporations.—Demonstration Plantation Co. v. Kearney, U. S. C. C. A., 270 Fed. 772.

50.——Hearsay Evidence.—Hearsay evidence alone will not support an award by the Workmen's Compensation Board.—Valentine v. Weaver, Ky., 228 S. W. 1036.

51.——Negligence of Independent Contractor. —An owner of premises who contracted to have safety doors installed on an elevator shaft as required by law, and who was obliged by his lease to keep the elevator running for his tenants, the work of installation being necessarily dangerous because of the operation of the elevator, is liable for the death of a workman caused by the negligence of the elevatorman, though the latter was employed by an inde-

pendent contractor.—Besner v. Central Trust Co., N. Y., 130 N. E. 577.

52.——Permanent Impairment.—The language of the last paragraph of Workmen's Compensation Act 1919, § 16, is not confined to cases of amputation, but includes all cases of injury to the members specified in that section not before provided for, where the usefulness of the member or any physical function thereof is permanently impaired; the word "class" including and referring to the injuries of the members enumerated in the section.—Clark v. Kennebec Journal Co., Me., 113 Atl. 51.

53. **Municipal Corporations** — Benefit Districts.—Where benefit districts for apportionment of cost of grading of street extended back 287 feet on one side of the street and 315 feet on the other side of the street, there was not such gross disparity as to require the court to hold that the parcel of land, the benefit district of which was 315 feet wide, was not a "block" with the charter providing that district should extend back to center of "block" if the land is laid off in blocks, and otherwise should extend back 150 feet.—West v. Burke, Mo., 228 S. W. 775.

54. **Parent and Child**—Employment of Minor. —Where the father, or, in case of his death, the mother, hires a minor son to an employer to do certain work, and the employer, without such parent's consent, puts the minor in a more dangerous employment in which he is injured, the employer is liable to the parent for the subsequent loss of the minor's services.—Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Hewell, Ga., 106 S. E. 558.

55. **Principal and Surety**—Delay.—Under a bond given to secure performance of a building contract, providing that no liability should attach to the surety for default on the part of the contractor unless the obligee should within 30 days after knowledge of such default give written notice to the surety, it was a matter somewhat for the architect to determine whether delays were due to the fault of the contractor, and notice given to the surety upon the first notice or certificate from the architect that the contractor was delaying the work was sufficient, though the limit of time for completing the work was then long past.—Cowles v. J. C. Mardis Co., Iowa, 181 N. W. 872.

56. **Sales**—Reasonable Time.—While a protracted course of dealing between the parties may be considered where the question of construction by the parties is involved, a single isolated previous transaction does not fall within the rule making commercial transactions between parties happening in the same way day after day indicative of what constitutes a reasonable time for acceptance of offer and what is so considered and treated by them.—Dulany-Vernay Co .v. Kalamazoo Stationery Co., Mich., 181 N. W. 984.

57.——Rescission.—In suit on the original obligation, or for recovery of the consideration, which has reverted to plaintiff buyer by virtue of his tender back of the chattel purchased on account of some defect, it is not necessary either to aver or prove a readiness at all times, or at any subsequent time, to deliver the chattel so tendered, which is equally true whether the effect of the tender is set up in a complaint or plea.—Maples v. Douglass, Ala., 87 So. 585.

58. **Statutes**—Special Privilege.—Laws 1919, p. 235, § 15½, prohibiting natural persons, firms, or partnerships from transacting the business of transmitting money to foreign countries or of buying and selling foreign money, or of receiving money on deposit to be transmitted to foreign countries, "provided that express, steamship and telegraph companies may continue their business of transmitting money and receiving money to be transmitted," held unconstitutional, in that it grants to such companies a special privilege from which all natural persons are excluded in violation of Const. art. 4, § 22, prohibiting special legislation.—Wedesweiler v. Brundage, Ill., 130 N. E. 520.

59. **Street Railroads**—Construction of Ordinance.—The operation by a traction company of its street cars over the tracks of another company under the terms of a city ordinance for so long as the two companies were separate corporations and for several years thereafter, with the consent of the city authorities, if not sufficient to establish estoppel to deny that the ordinance authorized such operation, is at least of weight as a construction by the parties that the ordinance authorized such operation.—Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. City of Richmond, Va., 106 S. E. 529.

60. **Theaters and Shows**—Negligence.—Passenger of pleasure resort roller coaster, who sat up the arm of the seat instead of in the seat itself, notwithstanding signs directing passengers to sit down and not stand up in the car, and notwithstanding instruction of employees to sit down, held contributorily negligent, precluding recovery of damages for his death after being thrown from car while rounding a curve. —State v. Glen Echo Park Co., Md., 113 Atl. 85.

61. **Trover and Conversion**—Measure of Recovery.—In an action for conversion of stock by a seller, brought after his refusal to make delivery on tender of the agreed price, the measure of recovery is the value of the stock at the time of the conversion, and defendant cannot then avoid liability by a tender of the stock, which in the meantime has declined in value.—Atkins v. Garrett, U. S. C. C. A., 270 Fed. 939.

62. **United States**—Soldier Injured on Railroad.—The War Risk Insurance Act, providing compensation for injuries to a soldier, was exclusive of all other remedies, so that no right to action against the Director General, who represented the United States, could be maintained by such soldier for injuries sustained on a government controlled railroad under Acts of Congress June 29, 1906, August 29, 1916, March 21, 1918, or February 28, 1920; such a suit would, on account of his status as a soldier, be a suit against the government.—Moon v. Hines, Ala., 87 So. 603.

63. **Vendor and Purchaser**—Option.—An option to purchase property if given for a valuable consideration is a valid contract, but if given without a consideration is a mere offer which may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance.—Morrison v. Johnson, Minn., 181 N. W. 945.

64. **Warehousemen**—Liability.—In an action against a warehouseman which plaintiff claimed had wrongfully delivered his goods to another, the fact that, when the goods were shipped by third person to the warehousemen, liability was released to obtain a low freight rate, is no ground for limiting warehousemen's liability.—Selb v. Pacific Storage & Transfer Co., Wash., 196 Pac. 584.

65. **Wills**—"Bodily Heirs."—In a deed conveying the estate to grantor's son for life and after his death in fee simple to his bodily heirs if any, and if none to his next of kin, the words "bodily heirs" mean children, so that the son took only a life estate which he could not devise and in which his widow was entitled to no dower, since it was not an estate of inheritance. —Wallace v. Wallace, N. C., 130 S. E. 501.

66.——Condition Subsequent.—Where testatrix devised land in trust to pay the larger portion of the proceeds to defendant provided she should furnish a home for the testatrix's feeble-minded son, with directions that upon the death of the son the land should be conveyed to defendant, the condition should be deemed one subsequent. —Jackson v. Knapp, Ill., 130 N. E. 524.

67.——Residuary Legatee.—Daughter named as residuary "legatee" held entitled to realty as well as personalty; "legacy."—Allen v. Cameron, N. C., 106 S. E. 484.

68.——Trust.—Where testatrix gave all the residue and remainder of her estate to be disposed of as the beneficiary might think would be in accordance with her wishes, the beneficiary must be deemed to hold such property in trust for the heirs at law of testatrix.—Buzzell v. Fogg, Me., 113 Atl. 50.

INDEX-DIGEST

TO THE EDITORIALS, NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS, LEADING ARTICLES, ANNOTATED CASES, LEGAL NEWS, CORRESPONDENCE AND BOOK REVIEWS IN VOL. 92.

A separate subject-index for the "Digest of Current Opinions" will be found on page 466, following this Index-Digest.

SUBJECT-INDEX

TO ALL THE "DIGESTS OF CURRENT OPINIONS" IN VOL. 91.

This subject-index contains a reference under its appropriate head to every digest of current opinions which has appeared in the volume. The references, of course, are to the pages upon which the digest may be found. There are no cross-references, but each digest is indexed herein under that head for which it would most naturally occur to a searcher to look. It will be understood that the page to which reference, by number, is made, may contain more than one case on the subject under examination, and therefore the entire page in each instance will necessarily have to be scanned in order to make effective and thorough search.

CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

INTERNATIONAL LAW LIST

A list composed of subscribers to the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL in good standing, and recommended by us to subscribers for use in the interchange of legal business. We advise that terms and fees for service be arranged by correspondence, as bar association rules in different localities make it impossible to publish a uniform scale of fees. Kindly mention the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL when corresponding with attorneys whose names appear in this list.

ALABAMA.

ALBANY.
G. O. Chenault.

ANNISTON.
R. B. Carr.

ATHENS.
W. R. Walker.

BAY MINETTE.
W. H. Hawkins.
Stone & Stone.

BIRMINGHAM.
H. C. Alford.
W. H. Anderson.
Lyon Bradley.
Chamblee & Chamblee.
W. A. Denson.
Leader, Ullman & Ewing.
Metz & Griffith.
Ivey F. Lewis.
F. W. McArthur.
Emmett O'Neal
Nathan L. Miller.
Hugh Morrow.
A. Leo Oberdorfer.
Erle Pettus.
W. K. Terry.
Tillman, Bradley & Morrow.
Wood & Pritchard.

CLANTON.
Grady Reynolds.

DOTHAN
Chapman & Lewis

ENTERPRISE
J. C. Yarbrougn.

EUFAULA.
Wm. H. Merrill.

FLORENCE.
A. A. Williams.

GADSDEN.
P. E. Culli.
Victor Vance

GENEVA.
W. O. Mulkey.

GREENVILLE.
Lane & Lane.

HEFLIN.
W. B. Merrill.

MOBILE.
Wm. H. Armbrecht.
Frederick G. Bromberg.
J. C. Crouch.
Leo M. Flynn.
Jesse F. Hogan.
Chas. W. Tompkins.

MONROEVILLE.
Barnett, Bugg & Lee.

MONTGOMERY.
W. M. Blakey.
Hill, Hill, Whiting & Thomas.

MONTGOMERY.
Stuart M. MacKenzie.
Steiner, Crum & Weil.
Ray Rushton.
Henry P. White.

OPELIKA.
N. D. Denson.

TALLADEGA
D. H. Riddle

TUSCUMBIA.
J. T. Kirk.

YORK.
John A. Altman.

ALASKA.

JUNEAU.
John Rustgard.
R. E. Robertson.

KETCHIKAN.
A. G. Shoup.

ARIZONA.

BISBEE.
Edw. J. Flanigan.

DOUGLAS.
C. V. Manatt.

FLORENCE.
E. P. Patterson.

HOLBROOK.
Clarence H. Jordan
Thorwald Larson.

KINGMAN.
Carl G. Crook.

NOGALES.
Leslie C. Hardy.

PHOENIX.
J. L. B. Alexander.
B. E. Marks.
G. P. Nevitt.

PRESCOTT.
Geo. W. Nilsson.

TUCSON.
Frank E. Curley.
Floyd Lewis.

YUMA
Peter T. Robertson.

ARKANSAS.

ARKADELPHIA.
W. H. Mizell.

ASHDOWN.
John J. Dulaney.

BATESVILLE.
Chas. F. Cole.
John B. McCaleb.

BLYTHEVILLE.
Davis, Costen & Harrison.
R. A. Nelson.

BOONEVILLE.
Evans & Evans.

BRINKLEY.
Bogle & Sharp.

DE QUEEN.
G. G. Billings.

EL DORADO.
R. G. Harper.
O. H. Sumpter.

FORREST CITY.
S. H. Mann.

FORT SMITH.
Covington & Grant.
John H. Holland.
Ira D. Oglesby.
Thos. B. Pryor.

GREENWOOD.
Geo. W. Johnson.

HARDY.
Arthur Sullivan

HARRISON.
J. Lloyd Shouse.

HARTFORD.
A. M. Dobbs.

HEBER SPRINGS
Mortimer Frauenthal.

HOT SPRINGS.
Arthur Cobb.
J. P. Henderson.

JONESBORO.
Basil Baker.
T. A. Turner.

LAKE VILLAGE.
B. F. Merritt.

LEWISVILLE.
King & Whatley.
R. L. Searcy.
Chas. B. Wellborn.

LITTLE ROCK.
John F. Clifford.
Ashley Cockrill.
Coleman, Robinson & House.
Marvin Harris.
H. T. Harrison.
Tom M. Mehaffy.
D. D. Terry.
Kinsworthy & Henderson.
Sam M. Wassell.
Samp. Jennings.

MENA.
Minor L. Pipkin.
B. J. Stewart.

MURFREESBORO
Claude A. Rankin

NASHVILLE.
J. L. Butt.

NEWPORT.
Royce & Mack.
John W. Stayton.

PARAGOULD.
Fuhr & Futrell.

PIGGOTT.
L. Hunter.

PINE BLUFF.
W. F. Coleman.
Taylor & Jones.

RUSSELLVILLE.
J. B. Ward.

STUTTGART.
Geo. C. Lewis.
Harry E. Meek.

TEXARKANA.
John N. Cook.
Thaddeus B. Vance.
Frank S. Quinn.

WASHINGTON.
W. H. Etter.

CALIFORNIA.

BAKERSFIELD.
E. J. Emmons.

BERKELEY.
Herbert W. Clark

CORNING.
E. L. Randall.

EL CENTRO.
H. E. Gleason.

FRESNO.
Chas. A. Hill.
Newton A. Johnson.
F. H. Short.
Alva E. Snow.
N. Lindsay South.
F. A. Willey.

GLENDORA.
R. B. Bidwell.

INDEPENDENCE.
Frank C. Scherrer.

LONG BEACH.
Geo. F. Kahn.
Bruce Mason.
McCaughan & McCaughan.
Adolph B. Rosenfeld.
Swaffield & Swaffield.

LOS ANGELES.
Harvey D. Cheney.
Fredericks & Hanna.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
Rex Hardy.
A. W. Hutton.
Thomas C. Job.
Frank James
Ben D. Koontz.
E. E. Milliken.
Nathan Newby.
Paran F. Rice.
Duke Stone.
Frank Wisdom.

LOS BANOS.
Geo. P. Ross.

NAPA.
John T. York.

OAKLAND.
Carl H. Abbott.
Chas. A. Beardsley.
Harmon Bell.
Jesse J. Dunn.
R. M. Fitzgerald.
Fred B. Hart.
Eugene E. Trefethen.

PASADENA.
J. M. Kerr.
RICHMOND.
C. S. Hannum.
RIVERSIDE.
C. W. Benshoof.
Adair & Winder.
ROSEVILLE.
J. B. Gibson.
SACRAMENTO.
J. W. S. Butler.
Devlin & Devlin.
H. W. Funke.
Pat Johnson.
Martin I. Welsh.
SAN DIEGO.
E. R. Bliss, Jr.
F. L. Richardson.
F. W. Stearns.
SAN FRANCISCO.
W. M. Abbott.
W. P. Bosley.
F. P. Deering.
Edward C. Harrison.
Knight & Heggerty.
Lent & Humphrey.
Augustin C. Keane.
G. W. McEnerney.
W. H. Orrick.
F. W. Sawyer.
Grant H. Smith.
Paul C. Thorne.
Owen M. Van Duyn.
SANTA ANA.
Horatio J. Forgy.
M. B. Wellington.
SANTA BARBARA.
T. R. Finley.
SANTA MARIA.
F. J. Feeney.
STOCKTON
A. H. Ashley.
TULARE.
C. L. Russell.
WILLOWS.
Frank Freeman.
YREKA
Tapscott & Tapscott.

COLORADO.

ANTONITO.
Ralph L. Carr.
BRECKINRIDGE.
Carl A. Kaiser.
COLORADO SPRINGS.
Norman M. Campbell.
James A. Orr.
DELTA.
Stewart & Stone.
DENVER.
Perry Behymer.
John T. Bottom.
E. N. Clark.
Paul M. Clark.
H. W. Danforth.
Thos. J. Dixon.
Henry A. Dubbs.
W. R. Eaton.
James E. Garrigues.
Goudy & Goudy.
Horace N. Hawkins.
Philip Hornbein.
Gerald Hughes.
Frederick T. Henry.
Henry McAllister, Jr.
Thos. J. O'Donnell.
R. D. Rees.
Howard S. Robertson.
Robinson & Robinson.
Barnwell S. Stuart.
D. L. Webb.
DURANGO.
Reese McCloskey.
FT. COLLINS.
Frank J. Annis.
R. W. Fleming.
Fred W. Stow.
FORT MORGAN
Walter S. Coen.
GRAND JUNCTION.
W. S. Furman.
S. M. Logan.
Guy V. Sternberg.
GREELEY.
F. J. Green.
Wm. H. Thompson.
Charles D. Todd.
IDAHO SPRINGS.
Fred P. Starke.
LA JUNTA.
Clyde T. Davis.
LAMAR.
Goodale & Horn.
LONGMONT.
Leo A. Noble.
ORDWAY.
Mast & Meikle.
RIFLE.
Elam B. Underhill.
STERLING.
Roy T. Johnson.
TELLURIDE.
L. W. Allen.
TRINIDAD.
Malcolm B. Erickson.
WALDEN.
Geo. J. Bailey.
YAMPA.
Gilbert A. Walker.

CONNECTICUT.

BRIDGEPORT.
Cullinan & Cullinan.
Albert J. Merritt.
HARTFORD.
John F. Forward.
John J. Dwyer.
Isidor E. Finkelstein.
Jacob Schwolsky.
MYSTIC.
Benjamin H. Hewitt.
NEW BRITAIN.
Henry Nowicki.
NEW HAVEN.
James E. Wheeler.
NEW LONDON.
Nathan Belcher.
Max Boyer.
Arthur B. Calkins.
H. A. Hull.
Arthur T. Keefe.
S. Victor Prince.
Thos. E. Troland.
STAMFORD.
Frederick C. Taylor.
UNIONVILLE.
Robert E. Taft.
WATERBURY.
T. F. Carmody.
John H. Cassidy.
James R. Lawlor.
Chas. G. Root.

DELAWARE.

WILMINGTON.
Thos. J. Laffey.
John P. Nields.
H. H. Ward.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

WASHINGTON.
John S. Barbour.
Walter E. Barton.
Geo. L. Boyle.
WASHINGTON.
Henry M. Foote
Melville Church.
C. L. Johnson.
Forney Johnston.
Geo. Shiras, Jr.
Chapin Browne.
Watson E. Coleman.
Thomas M. Henry.
Frank J. Hogan.
Leckie, Cox & Sherier.
George Sutherland.
F. S. Swindell.
J. C. Robertson.
Wayne B. Wheeler.

FLORIDA.

BARTOW.
Geo. W. Oliver.
H. K. Olliphant.
BONIFAY.
T. L. Bilsen.
J. A. J. Hathaway.
BRADENTOWN.
Dewey A. Dye.
CHIPLEY.
Ira A. Hutchison.
COCOA.
Gus C. Edwards.
DAYTONA.
Gardiner & Brass.
DE FUNIAK SPRINGS.
Wm. W. Flournoy.
D. N. Trotman.
DE LAND.
Stewart & Stewart.
FORT LAUDERDALE.
Maxwell Baxter.
JACKSONVILLE.
C. M. Cooper, Chas. P. & J. J. G. Cooper.
John C. Cooper, Jr.
Henry C. Clark.
E. J. L. Engle.
John E. Hartridge.
Kay, Adams & Ragland.
A. H. & Roswell King.
Knight & Adair.
Marks, Marks & Holt.
Miles W. Lewis.
P. H. Odom.
KISSIMMEE.
G. P. Garrett.
LAKELAND.
Peterson & Carver.
LIVE OAK.
L. E. Roberson.
MARIANNA.
John H. Carter.
F. M. Tipton.
MIAMI.
Carl T. Hoffman.
A. J. Rose.
Bart A. Riley.
MILTON.
L. V. Trueman.
L. T. Wiggins.
ORLANDO.
J. N. Hutchins.
Massey & Warlow.
PALATKA.
A. H. Odom.
PENSACOLA.
Philip D. Beall.
A. C. Binkley.
Wm. Fisher.
C. W. Girdlestone.
E. C. Maxwell.
Watson & Pasco.
W. B. Sheppard.
PERRY.
W. B. Davis.
QUINCY.
Jas. L. Davidson.
J. H. Harrell.
Y. L. Watson.
ST. AUGUSTINE.
G. W. Bassett, Jr.
SANFORD.
Schelle Maines.
SARASOTA.
W. Y. Perry.
TALLAHASSEE.
E. T. Davis.
Fred H. Davis.
W. J. Oven.
TAMPA.
Borchart & Borchart.
Wm. Hunter.
McMullen & Petteway.
K. I. McKay.
Wm. M. Taliaferro.
John P. Wall.

GEORGIA.

ALBANY.
Leonard Farkas.
Claude Payton.
AMERICUS.
W. W. Dykes.
J. A. Hixon.
G. R. Ellis.
J. Lewis Ellis.
T. O. Marshall.
ATHENS.
Erwin, Rucker & Nix.
Claud Mahaffey.
J. J. Strickland.
H. C. Tuck
ATLANTA.
Reuben R. Arnold.
Robert C. Alston.
Brewster, Howell & Heyman.
Geo. F. Gober.
J. L. Mayson.
Smith, Hammond & Smith.
Albert E. Mayer.
James A. Miller.
Benj. E. Pierce.
C. L. Pettigrew.
John M. Slaton.
Alex W. Stephens.
W. D. Thomson.
Edgar Watkins.
Geo. Westmoreland.
AUGUSTA.
C. H. & R. S. Cohen.
Wm. H. Fleming.
BAINBRIDGE.
H. G. Bell.
BARNESVILLE.
Charles J. Lester.
BRUNSWICK.
Daniel Webster Krauss.
Max Isaac.
CAMILLA.
Peacock & Gardner.
CLARKESVILLE.
McMillan & Erwin.
COLUMBUS.
Love & Fort.
Geo. C. Palmer.
Slade & Swift.
CORDELE.
A. S. Bussey.
F. G. Boatright.
Crum & Jones.
COVINGTON.
Chas. C. King.
DAWSON.
W. H. Gurr.
DUBLIN
C. C. Crockett.
EASTMAN.
D. D. Smith.

ELBERTON.
W. A. Nall.
FITZGERALD.
E. P. Keefer.
Alex J. McDonald.
GAINESVILLE.
A. C. Wheeler.
GRIFFIN.
L. P. Goodrich.
JASPER.
Roscoe Pickett.
JONESBORO.
John B. Hutcheson.
MACON.
Chas. J. Bloch.
Wm. W. Brewton.
Chas. H. Hall.
Harris, Harris & Witman.
Harry S. Strozier.
MONROE.
Orrin Roberts.
MONTEZUMA.
Jule Felton.
MONTICELLO.
Greene F. Johnson.
MOULTRIE.
R. J. Lewis.
OCILLA.
Rogers & Rogers.
PRESTON.
J. F. Souter.
ROCHELLE.
Harry A. Hodges.
ROME.
Linton A. Dean.
SAVANNAH.
S. B. Adams.
Robert L. Colding.
Gignilliat & O'Neal.
Lawton & Cunningham.
Jacob Gazan.
Peter W. Meldrim.
O'Byrne, Hartridge & Wright.
Osborne, Laurence & Abrahams.
Geo. W. Owens.
T. P. Ravenel.
Russell & Gignilliat.
SOPERTON.
D. R. Jackson.
STATESBORO.
R. L. Moore.
SWAINSBORO.
I. L. Price.
F. H. Saffold.
THOMASTON.
James R. Davis.
TIFTON
Fulwood & Hargrett.
TOCCOA.
John H. Davis & Son.
WASHINGTON.
Earle Norman.
WAYCROSS.
James F. Morgan.
Parks & Reed.
Wilson & Bennett.
WAYNESBORO.
Emory R. Price.
WRIGHTSVILLE.
A. L. Hatcher.

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

HILO.
Russell & Patterson.
HONOLULU.
Brown, Cristy & Davis.
Wm. T. Carden.
Thompson & Cathcart.
Ambrose J. Wirtz.
LIHUE.
Philip L. Rice.
WAILUKU.
E. R. Bevins.

IDAHO.

BOISE CITY.
Pasco B. Carter.
Chas. F. Koelsch.
T. L. Martin.
Oppenheim & Lampert.
BUHL.
Ostrom & Green.
BURLEY.
E. A. Britsch.
CALDWELL.
Judson A. Elston.
COUER D'ALENE.
M. G. Whitney.
COUNCIL.
L. L. Burtenshaw.
GOODING.
James & Ryan.
IDAHO FALLS.
O. A. Johannesen.
E. A. Owen.
KELLOGG.
Milton W. Emmet.
LEWISTON.
James E. Babb.
Fred E. Butler.
Chas. H. Chance.
Eugene A. Cox.
Leo McCarty.
Daniel Needham.
MONTPELIER.
D. C. Kunz.
NAMPA
D. L. Rhodes.
Geo. H. Van de Steeg.
OAKLEY.
W. L. Dunn.
POCATELLO.
Jos. E. Harvey.
Peterson & Coffin.
RUPERT.
H. A. Baker.
E. R. Dampier.
SANDPOINT.
Herman H. Taylor.
E. W. Wheelan.
TWIN FALLS.
W. P. Guthrie.
E. V. Larson.
O. W. Witham.

ILLINOIS.

AURORA.
B. P. Alschuler.
Peffers & Wing.
Roy J. Solfisburg.
BELLEVILLE.
Albert B. Ogle.
BELVIDERE.
P. H. O'Donnell.
BLOOMINGTON.
Barry & Morrissey.
Chas. M. Buck.
A. E. & R. C. De Mange.
Jesse E. Hoffman
CARLYLE.
Hugh V. Murray.
H. G. Weber.
CARMI.
Chas. T. Randolph.
CARTERVILLE.
H. G. Gallimore.
CARTHAGE.
Charles J. Scofield.
Hartzell & Cavanaugh.
CENTRALIA.
Logan B. Skipper.
CHAMPAIGN.
R. S. Bauer.
CHRISTOPHER.
H. E. Morgan.
CHICAGO.
E. A. Aborn.
Ashcraft & Ashcraft
F. L. Boyd.
Aug. Binswanger.
Buell & Abbey.
H. G. Colson.
E. S. Cummings.
D'Ancona & Pflaum.
Thos. Dent.
F. B. Ebbert.
Robert L. Elliott.
Ray F. Feagans.
Timothy J. Fell.
Chas. J. Gallagher.
Ben F. Goldstein.
John R. Guilliams.
Milton Hart.
Roy M. Harmon.
Henry M. Hagan.
Hennings & Thulin.
Andrew Hummeland.
John L. Hopkins.
Jas. C. McMath.
Chas. J. Michal.
John S. Miller.
H. W. Norton.
Perry Patterson.
Pomeroy & Martin.
Joseph A. McInerney.
James C. McShane.
A. W. Martin.
M. A. Mergentheim.
Wm. F. Mulvihill.
Edwin A. Munger.
Geo. H. Peaks.
Norman H. Pritchard.
F. P. Read.
A. A. Rolf.
Mark R. Sherman.
Shortall & Murison.
R. B. Scott.
J. A. Shannon.
Rosenthal, Hamill & Wormser.
Edgar B. Tolman.
Chas. J. Trainor.
C. F. Wiehe.
Winston, Strawn & Shaw.
Harris F. Williams
Ziv, Loomis & Silvertrust.
DANVILLE.
Walter T. Gunn.
Oliver D. Mann.
Lindley, Penwell & Lindley.
DECATUR.
Fannie A. Bivans.
Baldwin & Carey.
Jesse L. Deck.
James A. Henson.
DIXON.
John P. Devine.
DOWNER'S GROVE.
A. B. Snow.
DWIGHT.
Roy V. Seymour.
E. ST. LOUIS.
Kramer, Kramer & Campbell.
J. R. McMurdo.
E. C. Zulley.
EDWARDSVILLE.
R. F. Tunnell, Jr.
D. G. Williamson.
ELIZABETHTOWN.
James A. Watson.
ERIE.
Earl R. Scott.
EVANSTON.
Robt. H. Gault.
FARMER CITY.
Herrick & Herrick.
FREEPORT.
Albert H. Manus.
FULTON.
C. C. McMahon.
GALESBURG.
Williams, Lawrence, Green & Gale.
M. E. Zetterholm.
GRANITE CITY.
John B. Harris.
HARVARD.
P. J. Donovan.
HERRIN.
A. D. Morgan.
HIGHLAND PARK.
John E. Conrad.
JACKSONVILLE.
Wm. N. Hairgrove.
Carl E. Robinson.
Wm. T. Wilson.
JOLIET.
Cowing & King.
KANKAKEE.
Smith & Marcotte.
Alex J. Powell.
Walter C. Schneider.
LAWRENCEVILLE.
Noah M. Tohill.
LINCOLN.
Smith & Edgell.
LITCHFIELD.
Paul McWilliams.
MACOMB.
Chas. I. Imes.
Geo. B. Kerman.
MARION.
Geo. B. White.
MATTOON.
Andrews & Real.
Bryan H. Tivnen.
McLEANSBORO.
David J. Underwood.
MAYWOOD.
Geo. W. Carr.
MONMOUTH.
R. J. Grier.
MOUND CITY.
C. S. Miller.
MURPHYSBORO.
H. Fletcher Lewis.
NOKOMIS.
J. D. Wilson.
OREGON.
Jas. L. McDowell.
OTTAWA.
Jas. J. Conway.
W. H. Hinebaugh.
Rector C. Hitt.
PEKIN.
Prettyman, Velde & Prettyman.
PEORIA.
L. O. Eagleton.
McRoberts & Morgan.
Geo. A. Shurtleff.
PERU.
Hoberg & Hoberg.
POLO.
Robert L. Bracken.
QUINCY.
Rolland M. Wagner.
RANTOUL.
Jas. F. Clark.
ROCHELLE.
E. L. McConaughy.
ROCKFORD.
A. D. Early.
C. W. Ferguson.
Frank H. Hall.
Robt. Rew.

ROCK ISLAND.
Albert Huber.
Kenworthy, Dietz, Shallberg, Harper & Sennett.
Stafford, Schoede & Stafford.

ROOTHOUSE.
W. B. Strang.

RUSHVILLE.
Lewis A. Jarman.

SPRINGFIELD.
W. W. Edwards.
A. M. Fitzgerald.
J. T. Garretson.
Geo. B. & Geo. M. Gillespie.
G. W. Murray.
Wm. B. Risse.
Harlington Wood

STREATOR.
G. H. Belford.
Wm. H. Boys.

SYCAMORE.
John Faissler.

URBANA.
W. G. Spurgin.

WATSEKA.
A. F. Goodyear.
John P. Pallissard.

WAUKEGAN.
O. S. Fuqua.
Leslie P. Hanna.

WEST FRANKFORT.
Frank E. Trobaugh.

WYOMING.
John W. Fling, Jr.

INDIANA.

ANDERSON.
J. A. Van Osdal.

BRAZIL.
A. W. Knight.

BROOKVILLE.
Cecil C. Tague.

CAMBRIDGE CITY.
John W. Dodson.

COLUMBUS.
John Rynerson

CONNERVILLE.
E. Ralph Himelick.

CRAWFORDSVILLE.
Benj. Crane.

CROWN POINT.
Martin J. Smith.

E. CHICAGO.
Riley, Hembroff, Dyer & Reed.

ELKHART.
Verne G. Cawley.
C. C. Raymer.

EVANSVILLE.
Funkhouser, Funkhouser & Markel.
H. W. Kamman.
Stone, Kreuzberger & Bock.
Welman & Darby

FORT WAYNE.
A. L. Aiken.
Breen & Morris.
E. V. Emrick.
Samuel M. Hench.
F. H. Kleekamp.
C. R. McNabb.
W. H. Shambaugh.
Wm. P. Walter.

FRANKFORT.
Thos. M. Ryan.

FRANKLIN.
White & Owens.

GARRETT.
F. A. Nash.

GARY.
John O. Bowers.
Leonard W. Felker.
Cassius M. Greenlee.
Thaddeus Menezynski.
John W. Thiel.

GOSHEN.
A. S. Zook.

GREENCASTLE.
B. F. Corwin.

GREENFIELD.
Leslie Childs.

GREENSBURG.
John F. Goddard.
Rollin A. Turner.
Wickens & Osborn.

HAMMOND.
Bomberger, Peters & Northland.
F. Crumpacker.
E. G. Sproat.

HUNTINGTON.
Milo M. Feightner.
Sumner Kenner.

INDIANAPOLIS.
Bachelder & Bachelder.
Bingham & Bingham
Clarence A. Call.
Earl R. Conder.
Charles E. Cox.
Lehman & Faust.
Que A. Forshan.
Geo. W. Galvin.
E. H. Iglehart.
Geo. O. Lehman.
Frank L. Littleton.
Emil C. Stroeh.
Harold Taylor.
W. W. Thornton.
Jos. P. Turk.
D. E. Watson.
Geo. W. Young.

INDIANA HARBOR.
W. J. Murray.

KNIGHTSTOWN.
Newby & Newby.

KNOX.
Chas. H. Peters.

KOKOMO.
Bell & Kirkpatrick.
Jos. C. Herron.

LADOGA.
Robert W. Marks.

LAFAYETTE.
Gaylord & Sills.
W. H. Parkinson.
Chas. A. West.

LA PORTE.
Osborn, Osborn & Link.

LAWRENCEBURG.
Estal G. Bielby.

LOGANSPORT.
Arthur & Arthur.
Chas. E. Hale.

MARION.
H. J. Paulus.

MISHAWAKA.
Enos E. Long.

MUNCIE.
Orr & Clark.
W. F. White.

NAPPANEE.
Perry A. Early.

NEW ALBANY.
Geo. H. Hester.
Geo. B. McIntyre.

NEWCASTLE.
Geo. D. Forkner.

NOBLESVILLE.
Robert H. Kinney.

NORTH VERNON.
Wm. Fitzgerald.

OSGOOD.
Vernon M. Vayhinger.

PERU.
Cox & Andrews.

PETERSBURG.
W. D. Curll.

RICHMOND.
Gardner, Jessup, Hoelscher & White.

ROCKPORT.
James L. Houston.

SOUTH BEND
Orlo R. Deahl.
Edwin H. Sommerer.
Thad M. Talcott, Jr.

SPENCER.
I. H. Fowler.

TERRE HAUTE.
Wm. T. Douthitt.
Caldwell & Duff.
Otis Cook.
Ora D. Davis.
J. F. Fix.

UNION CITY.
Wm. W. Fowler.

VINCENNES.
Curtis G. Shake.
J. P. L. Weems.

WARSAW.
L. W. Royse.

IOWA.

ALBIA.
John T. Clarkson.
Miller & Everett.

ALGONA.
W. B. Quarton.

ALTON.
C. W. Pitts.

ATLANTIC.
E. M. Willard.

BEDFORD.
Flick & Flick.
Frank Wisdom.
Wm. M. Jackson.

BOONE.
Dyer, Jordan & Dyer.
J. R. Whitaker.

BROOKLYN.
Frank R. Talbott.

BURLINGTON.
LaMonte Cowles.
Hirsch & Riepe.

CEDAR FALLS.
J. B. Newman.
C. M. Parker.

CEDAR RAPIDS.
Rickel & Dennis.
Redmond & Stewart.

CHARLES CITY.
J. C. Campbell.

CLARINDA.
H. E. Davidson.

COUNCIL BLUFFS.
Fremont Benjamin.
Bert L. Dickason.
John J. Ferguson.
Kimball, Peterson & Smith.
Tinley, Mitchell, Pryor & Ross.

CRESTON.
Kenneth H. Davenport.

DAVENPORT.
Jas. W. Bollinger.
Chas. Gilchrist.
Ralph G. Smith.

DECORAH.
H. F. Barthell.

DES MOINES
Bowen & Alberson.
M. H. Cohen
Frank H. Dewey
Halloran & Starkey.
Clyde Kirk.

DES MOINES.
Mulvaney & Mulvaney.
Miller, Kelley & Seeburger.
Miller, Parker, Riley & Stewart.
Clinton L. Nourse.
Oscar Strauss.
Sullivan & Sullivan.
S. G. Van Auken.
Geo. Wambach.
Clark, Byers & Hutchinson.
Everett Brown.
Ben J. Hitz.
Jensen & Connolly.
Chas. M. McDonnell.
Clarence I. Spencer.
J. C. Shoemaker.
H. O. Vralsted.
E. S. Warren.
Chandler Woodbridge.

DUBUQUE.
J. P. Frantzen.
Kenline & Roedell.

EMMETSBURG.
McCarty & McCarty.

ESTHERVILLE.
F. J. Kennedy.

FORT DODGE.
Robert Healy.

GREENFIELD.
Frank B. Wilson.

GRINNELL.
Harold F. Beyer.

HAMBURG.
R. F. Hickman.

HAWARDEN.
C. E. Gantt.

HUMBOLDT.
D. F. Coyle.
Lorenzo W. Housel.
Frank Lovrein.

INDIANOLA.
O. C. Brown.

IOWA CITY.
Geo. W. Ball.
Chas. M. Dutcher.

LAKE PARK.
W. J. Bock.

LANSING.
Frank L. May.

LAURENS.
F. C. Gilchrist.

LEON.
Francis Varga.

LOGAN.
Roy Havens.

MANCHESTER.
Fred B. Blair.

MARSHALLTOWN.
W. T. Bennett.
E. N. Farber.
C. H. Van Law

MASON CITY.
Blythe, Markley, Rule & Smith.

MONTEZUMA.
Frank Bechly.

NEVADA.
Geo. C. White.

NORTHWOOD.
Carl O. Gunderson
Thos. A. Kingland.

OSAGE.
A. E. Brown.

OSKALOOSA.
Burrell & Devitt.
H. B. McCoy.

OTTUMWA.
Wm. A. Hunt.
Ernest R. Mitchell.
J. F. Webber.

POCAHONTAS
Hudson & Hudson.

PRIMGHAR.
O. H. Montzheimer.
RED OAK.
R. W. Beeson.
REINBECK.
S. W. De Wolf.
ROCKWELL CITY.
S. A. Frick.
SHELDON.
T. E. Diamond.
SHENANDOAH.
Earl R. Ferguson.
SIGOURNEY.
Talley & Snakenberg.
SIOUX CITY.
Herbert W. Brackney.
A. C. Hatt.
Kass Bros.
A. C. McGill.
Robert B. Pike.
Sears, Snyder & Gleysteen.
Edw. E. Wagner.
SPENCER.
J. W. Cory, Jr.
Heald & Cook.
TAMA.
J. W. Willett.
TIPTON.
J. C. France.
W. G. W. Geiger.
TOLEDO.
Struble & Stiger.
C. E. Walters.
VINTON.
Clarence Nichols.
WAPELLO.
H. O. Weaver.
WATERLOO.
Edwards, Longley, Ransier & Harris.
James T. Knapp.
WEBSTER CITY.
Wesley Martin.
WINTERSET.
S. A. Hays.

KANSAS.

ARKANSAS CITY.
C. L. Swarts.
L. C. Brown.
Faulconer & Wright.
ASHLAND.
H. R. Daigh.
ATCHISON.
Ralph U. Pfouts.
BAXTER SPRINGS.
G. W. Staton.
BELOIT.
R. M. Anderson.
C. L. Kagey.
Frank A. Lutz.
BLUE RAPIDS.
C. D. Smith.
CHANUTE.
Jones & Allen.
COFFEYVILLE.
W. E. Zeigler.
COLDWATER.
Jay T. Botts.
COLUMBUS.
I. N. Kuhn.
C. A. McNeil.
CONCORDIA.
A. M. French.
ELLSWORTH.
Samuel E. Bartlett.
EMPORIA.
E. N. Evans.
Owen S. Samuel.
W. N. Smelser.
FORT SCOTT.
John H. Crain.
Wm. P. Dillard.
A. M. Keene.
FREDONIA.
W. H. Edmundson.
James N. Kennedy.
Sheedy & Stryker.
GALENA.
Maurice McNeill.
GOODLAND.
Elmer E. Euwer.
HAYS
E. C. Flood.
C. M. Holmquist.
HIAWATHA.
W. F. Means.
HOWARD.
Clifford Sullivan.
HOXIE.
C. L. Thompson.
HUTCHINSON.
Wm. H. Burnett.
John F. Rhodes.
F. Dumont Smith.
Taylor & Connaughton.
JUNCTION CITY.
Humphrey & Humphrey.
U. S. Weary.
KANSAS CITY.
Wm. Drennan.
C. O. Littick.
Wm. H. McHale, Jr.
James M. Meek.
C. Clyde Myers.
T. F. Railsback.
Stanley & Stanley.
Chas. E. Thompson.
Brady & Mellott
LA CROSSE.
Henry F. Herrman.
LAWRENCE.
L. H. Menger.
A. B. Mitchell.
Edw. T. Riling.
LEAVENWORTH.
Ben F. Endres.
Floyd E. Harper.
M. N. McNaughton.
J. H. Wendorff.
LIBERAL.
V. H. Grinstead.
LINCOLN.
John J. McCurdy.
MANKATO.
R. C. Postlethwaite.
MEDICINE LODGE.
Seward I. Field.
Noble, Tincher & Houck.
NEWTON.
Ezra Branine.
OBERLIN.
Noble & Noble.
OSAWATOMIE.
Ben F. Winchel.
OSWEGO.
Elmer W. Columbia.
PARSONS.
Kimball & Osgood.
RUSSELL.
J. G Vogelsang.
SALINA.
W. B. Crowthers.
John H. Wilson.
SCOTT CITY.
Ed R. Bane.
R. D. Armstrong.
ST. MARYS.
Maurice Murphy.
SEDAN.
Carl Ackarman.
SMITH CENTER.
L. C. Uhl & Son.
SYRACUSE.
H. E. Walter.
TOPEKA.
Harry W. Allen.
Harry W. Colmery.
TOPEKA.
J. A. Fleming.
P. H. Forbes.
Blair & Lillard.
Leonard S. Ferry.
Monroe, Hursh, Sloan & Monroe.
W. A. S. Bird.
Richard J. Hopkins.
D. R. Hite.
A. M. Thomas.
TROY
A. L. Perry.
WELLINGTON.
W. T. McBride.
WICHITA.
John W. Adams.
Campbell & Campbell.
Chas. B. Dunn.
E. L. Foulke.
Geo. Gardner.
Houston & Brooks.
W. D. Jochems.
D. W. Eaton.
Stultz & Bryant.
Chester I. Long.
J. C. Shearman.
I. H. Stearns.
Vermilion, Evans, Carey & Lilleston.
Thos. C. Wilson.
WINFIELD.
S. C. Bloss
A. M. Jackson.

KENTUCKY.

ASHLAND.
Clyde R. Levi.
Mont Walker.
John W. Woods.
BARDSTOWN.
Nat W. Halstead.
BENTON.
E. L. Cooper.
DIXON.
Bourland & Blackwell.
FRANKLIN.
W. R. Peebles.
GLASGOW.
W. L. Porter.
HICKMAN.
Stanley D. Stembridge.
HOPKINSVILLE.
J. A. McKenzie.
JENKINS.
H. L. Moore.
LEXINGTON.
Chester D. Adams.
Richard J. Colbert.
Wm. C. G. Hobbs.
Geo. R. Hunt.
LOUISA.
Fred M. Vinson.
LOUISVILLE.
James P. Brown.
Wm. F. Clarke, Jr.
William B. Eagles.
H. B. Fleece.
J. F. O'Neal.
Henry J. Stites.
Morton K. Yonts.
Beckham Overstreet.
MADISONVILLE.
Gordon, Gordon & Moore.
MANCHESTER.
A. T. W. Manning.
MAYSVILLE.
Stanley Reed.
MIDDLESBORO.
John Howard.
MORGANFIELD.
Allen, Harris & Allen.
MT. VERNON.
C. C. Williams.
OWENSBORO.
Gilbert Holbrook.
O. L. Fowler.
Albert B. Oberst.
PADUCAH.
B. M. Philley.
PIKEVILLE.
S. Marion Cecil.
PINEVILLE.
Cleon K. Calvert.
RICHMOND.
John Noland.
RUSSELLVILLE.
S. R. Crewdson.
WILLIAMSBURG.
H. H. Tye.

LOUISIANA.

ALEXANDRIA.
J. W. Hawthorne.
BATON ROUGE.
R. L. Tullis.
COVINGTON.
B. M. Miller.
CROWLEY.
Claude L. Chappius.
FRANKLIN.
Paul Kramer.
FRANKLINTON.
Ott & Johnson.
LEESVILLE.
C. E. Hardin.
MINDEN.
L. K. Watkins.
MORGAN CITY.
Chas. L. Wise.
NEW ORLEANS.
H. M. Ansley.
Chas. F. Buck, Jr.
Caffery, Quintero, Gidiere & Brumby.
Nicholas G. Carbajal.
Carroll & Carroll.
Dart & Kernan.
J. C. Davey.
Frank B. Davenport.
Prentice Edrington, Jr.
Farrar, Goldburg & Dufour.
Foster, Milling, Saal & Milling.
Lewis R. Graham.
E. H. McCaleb.
Chas. J. Rivet.
McCloskey & Benedict.
Richard B. Montgomery.
Wm. R. Kinsella.
Lazarus, Michie & Lazarus.
Morris P. Le Compte.
John J. O'Connor.
G. B. Smart.
Frank Soule.
R. A. Tichenor.
PLAQUEMINE.
Joseph Nicolosi.
RUSTON.
Barksdale & Barksdale.
SHREVEPORT.
Thatcher & Welch.

MAINE.

CALAIS.
Ashley St. Clair.
CORNISH.
Walter P. Perkins.
FOXCROFT.
C. W. Hayes.

GORHAM.
J. A. Waterman.
LEWISTON.
J. G. Chabot.
MADISON.
C. O. Small.
PORTLAND.
John T. Fagan.
Harry E. Nixon.
Frank W. Robinson.
H. P. Sweetser.
RUMFORD.
Albert Beliveau.
WATERVILLE.
Chas. W. Atchley.
WESTBROOK.
Wm. Lyons.

MARYLAND.

BALTIMORE.
J. Henry Baker.
Walter H. Buck.
Walter L. Clark.
Hon. John J. Dobler.
Frank, Emory & Beuwkes.
Chas. F. Harley.
John Hinkley.
Chas. M. Howard.
Edwin C. Irelan.
W. L. Marbury.
E. N. Rich.
CAMBRIDGE.
J. W. S. Cochrane.
BEL AIR.
Philip H. Close.
DENTON.
T. A. Goldsborough.
HAGERSTOWN.
Chas. W. Baker.
Albert J. Long.
Elias B. Hartle.
J. Augustine Mason.
Leon R. Yourtee.
HYATTSVILLE.
James C. Waters, Jr.
PRINCE FREDERICK.
John P. Briscoe.
SALISBURY.
F. Leonard Wailes.
WESTERNPORT.
Horace P. Whitworth.

MASSACHUSETTS.

ADAMS.
Edwin K. McPeck.
BOSTON.
Frank W. Grinnell.
S. K. Hamilton.
Adolph M. Schwarz.
BROOKLINE.
Alfred D. Chandler.
CAMBRIDGE.
Prof. Roscoe Pound.
FITCHBURG.
John F. McGrath.
LAWRENCE.
Wm. C. & E. J. Ford.
LENOX.
C. J. Broderick.
LOWELL.
John J. Pickman.
SPRINGFIELD.
James B. Carroll.
WORCHESTER.
Wm. C. Mellish.
Chas. T. Tatman.

MICHIGAN.

ALPENA.
I. S. Canfield.
ANN ARBOR.
M. J. Cavanaugh.
Frank B. De Vine.
BATTLE CREEK.
Ira A. Beck.
J. L. Hooper.
Burritt Hamilton.
Willard A. Knight.
BAY CITY.
A. M. King.
Robert H. Lane.
BESSEMER.
Solomon W. Patek.
BIG RAPIDS.
Fred R. Everett.
CALUMET.
Galbreath & McCormick.
CROSWELL.
George Flott.
DETROIT.
Chas. L. Bartlett.
Black & Black.
Chas. F. Carney.
C. J. Cole.
Sidney S. Cole.
E. S. Clarkson.
R. M. Connor.
Crandell & Tinkham.
John G. Cross.
D. B. Duffield.
Carl B. Grawn.
Wm. L. January.
Keena, Lightner, Oxtoby & Hanley.
Wm. O'Neill Kronner.
Fred A. Lehman.
B. J. Lincoln.
Harold R. Martin.
Sidney T. Miller.
Ira F. Morgan.
J. Lawrence Primrose.
Wm. S. Sayres, Jr.
Newman Smith.
Royal F. Sweet.
Henry E. Walters.
Whyte & Beyer.
Ford M. Yokom.
ESCANABA
H. J. Rushton.
FLINT.
Brownell, McBride & Gault.
Leo M. Church
Van Benschoten & Millard
Carton, Roberts & Stewart.
FREMONT.
White & Reber.
GRAND HAVEN.
Louis H. Osterhous.
Walter I. Lillie.
GRAND RAPIDS.
Colin P. Campbell.
B. M. Corwin.
Reuben Hatch.
Dorr Kuizema.
Charles H. Lillie.
IRON RIVER.
Dan J. O'Hara.
IRONWOOD.
Waples & Waples.
ITHACA.
John W. Myers.
JACKSON.
H. A. Kinch.
KALAMAZOO.
C. S. Carney.
LANSING.
Dean W. Kelley.
Samuel H. Rhoades.
MENOMINEE.
John O'Hara.
MUNISING.
Richard E. O'Brien.
OWOSSO.
Miner & Miner.
PAW PAW.
Thos. J. Cavanaugh.
A. Lynn Free.
PONTIAC.
Robert D. Heitsch.
SAGINAW.
R. L. Crane.
Robert J. Curry.
Alfred H. Meyer.
ST. JOHN'S.
Wm. M. Smith.

MINNESOTA.

ADA.
Brattland & McLaughlin.
ALBERT LEA.
H. H. Dunn.
ARGYLE.
E. A. Brekke.
AUSTIN.
Martin A. Nelson.
BAGLEY.
Oscar T. Stenvick.
BEMIDJI.
Chas. W. Scrutchin.
BLUE EARTH.
D. L. Morse.
BIRD ISLAND.
Murray & Baker.
BRECKINRIDGE.
John P. Kain.
CAMBRIDGE.
Godfrey G. Goodwin.
CHISHOLM.
Alger R. Syme.
CROOKSTON.
W. E. Rowe.
DETROIT.
P. C. Schroeder.
DULUTH.
F. T. Cuthbert.
John G. Williams.
Washburn, Bailey & Mitchell.
ELBOW LAKE.
E. J. Scofield.
FAIRMONT.
C. F. Gaarenstrom.
FERGUS FALLS.
Leonard Eriksson.
GAYLORD.
T. O. Streissguth.
GRAND RAPIDS.
Alfred L. Thwing.
HAWLEY.
Hammett & Morton.
HIBBING.
Philip M. Stone.
LITTLE FALLS.
A. H. Vernon.
MADELIA.
Carl J. Eide.
MANKATO.
C. J. Laurisch.
F. E. Morse.
J. W. Schmitt.
McINTOSH.
Theo. F. Neils.
MINNEAPOLIS.
Brady, Robertson & Bonner.
Rome G. Brown.
Davis & Michel.
Trafford N. Jayne.
F. B. Dodge.
Fifield & Finney.
Fowler, Schmitt, Carlson & Furber.
Frank Healy.
Jamison, Stinchfield & Mackall.
M. M. Joyce.
MINNEAPOLIS.
John J. Martin.
A. C. Middlestadt.
Edward Nelson.
E. A. Prendergast.
James D. Shearer.
Paul J. Thompson.
S. R. Child.
M. E. Culhane.
James E. Carr.
Duxbury & Bissell.
S. M. Finch.
H. M. Halverson.
Arthur M. Higgins.
Walter H. Hennessey.
James C. Melville.
Lundeen & Lundeen.
Seth Lundquist.
Arthur E. Olson.
John Ott.
Powell, Carman & Cain.
Rose & Brill.
Shaw, Safford, Ray & Shaw.
Jay W. Smith.
J. J. Truax.
Olof L. Bruce.
John F. Bernhagen.
Geo. M. Bleecker.
Harry K. Bikson.
John F. Byers.
F. Gordon Wright.
OWATONNA.
Nelson & Nelson.
PIPESTONE.
Geo. P. Gurley.
M. J. Meeker.
ROCHESTER.
Burt W. Eaton.
REDWOOD FALLS.
A. C. Dolliff.
ST. JAMES.
Albert Running.
ST. PAUL.
Alf. E. Boyeson.
Pierce Butler.
John C. De Courcy.
Donald S. Doty.
Milton P. Firestone.
G. Loevinger.
R. G. O'Malley.
Edward P. Sanborn.
Chas. E. Bowen.
Frank M. Butler.
Ferdinand Barta.
Douglas, Kennedy & Kennedy.
D. E. Dwyer.
Peder M. Hage.
Stephen C. Harholdt.
Valdemar Hansen.
A. J. Hertz.
Chas. S. Hoff.
Jos. J. Joyce.
Harry S. Locke.
McGrath & Morse.
Geo. L. Siegel.
James F. McNeely.
James Mattimore.
H. W. Phillips.
Oliver G. Wondra.
E. S. Thompson.
Essie W. Williams.
John W. Willis.
WARREN.
Julius J. Olson.
WASECA.
John Moonan.
Chas. Spillane.
WILLMAR.
Chas. A. Oberg.
WINONA.
Brown, Abbott & Somsen.
Henry M. Lamberton.
Geo. R. Little.
WORTHINGTON.
A. B. Hughes.

MISSISSIPPI.

ABERDEEN.
W. H. Clifton.
G. J. Leftwich.

BROOKHAVEN.
T. Brady, Jr.
P. Z. Jones.
CORINTH.
W. C. Sweat.
GREENVILLE.
R. B. Campbell.
GULFPORT.
R. C. Cowan.
W. M. Denny.
Wm. E. Estopinal.
John L. Heiss.
J. P. Moorman.
GREENWOOD.
R. C. McBee.
Whittington & Osborn.
HATTIESBURG.
Currie & Smith.
T. C. Hannah.
JACKSON.
E. L. Trenholm.
R. H. Thompson.
LAUREL.
W. S. Welch.
LEXINGTON.
E. F. Noel.
NATCHEZ.
A. H. Geisenberger.
OKOLONA.
R. J. West.
POPLARVILLE.
Marion Morse.
SHELBY.
Thos. G. Jordan.
SUMNER.
R. L. Cannon.
TUPELO.
W. D. Anderson.
Robins & Thomas.
VICKSBURG.
T. G. Birchett.
R. L. Dent.
N. Vick Robbins.
WIGGINS.
W. C. Batson.
WOODVILLE.
D. C. Bramlette, Jr.
Ackland H. Jones.

MISSOURI.

BROOKFIELD.
H. J. West.
CHILLICOTHE.
L. A. Chapman.
COLLINS.
W. H. Plaster.
CRANE.
J. William Cook.
FESTUS.
Albert S. Ennis.
GENTRY.
W. F. Seevers.
HARRISONVILLE.
J. R. Nicholson.
W. D. Summers.
HOUSTON.
Barton & Impey.
Robert Lamar.
INDEPENDENCE.
John H. Hardin.
JEFFERSON CITY.
Pope & Lohman.
JOPLIN.
J. C. Ammerman.
KANSAS CITY.
Henry D. Ashley.
Murat Boyle.
J. W. Burke.
Edwin Camack.
Thos. P. Fenlon.
Krauthoff, McClintock & Quant.
Elliott H. Jones.
KANSAS CITY.
Thad. B. Landon.
Clement A. Lawler.
W. H. H. Piatt.
Grant I. Rosenzweig.
C. E. Small.
Warner, Dean, McLeod & Langworthy.
Harry W. Durall.
Ben R. Estill.
Toby Fishman.
S. R. Layton.
Morrison, Nugent & Wylder.
H. T. Reilly, Jr.
Omar E. Robinson.
KIRKSVILLE.
S. W. Mills.
LEBANON.
A. W. Curry.
Phil M. Donnelly.
MACON.
Nat M. Lacy.
MARYVILLE.
Richard L. McDougal.
MEXICO.
Clarence Barnes.
W. W. Fry, Jr.
MORERLY.
Hunter & Chamier.
NEOSHO.
L. D. Rice.
PLATTE CITY.
Jas. H. Hull.
POPLAR BLUFF.
Abington & Abington.
RICHMOND.
T. N. Lavelock.
ST. JOSEPH.
Eastin & McNeely.
Geo. W. Groves.
ST. LOUIS.
Shepard Barclay.
C. P. Berry.
Arnim C. Beste.
P. Taylor Bryan.
Boyle & Priest.
Carter, Collins & Jones.
Cobbs & Logan.
Edward D'Arcy.
John P. Douglas.
W. H. Douglass.
Marion C. Early.
F. H. Eschman.
W. F. Evans.
Forrest G. Ferris.
D. A. Frank.
J. C. Fisher.
Bernard Greensfelder.
Claud D. Hall.
Virgil Harris.
Chas. M. Hay.
David W. Hill.
Richard A. Jones.
Jones, Hocker, Sullivan & Angert.
Judson, Green & Henry.
Chester H. Krum.
J. F. Lee.
F. W. Lehmann.
P. P. Mason.
John J. Nangle.
Walter H. Nohl.
John J. O'Brien.
A. H. Robbins.
Luther E. Smith.
Arthur Stahl.
D. Upthegrove.
John C. Vaughn.
Percy Werner.
Edw. J. White.
H. C. Whitehill.
James E. Withrow.
Terrell Williams.
Pleasant V. Wilson.
SALEM.
G. C. Dalton.
SAVANNAH.
Booher & Williams.
SENATH.
W. G. Bray.
SPRINGFIELD.
John H. Bradley.
Hamlin & Hamlin.
TARKIO.
John A. Gurlash.
TRENTON.
Platt Hubbell.
TROY.
R. L. Sutton.
VAN BUREN.
Garry H. Yount.

MONTANA.

ANACONDA.
D. H. Morgan.
BIG TIMBER.
Chas. W. Campbell.
BILLINGS.
Henry A. Chapple.
Collins & Wood.
E. E. Enterline.
Grimstad & Brown.
R. O. Lunke.
Nichols & Wilson.
BUTTE.
John K. Claxton.
J. E. Healy.
H. A. Tyvand.
Wheeler & Baldwin.
DENTON.
John W. McCauley.
DILLON.
John Collins.
Thos. E. Gilbert.
FORSYTH.
Geo. A. Horkan.
FORT BENTON.
C. L. Clark.
GREAT FALLS.
G. S. Frary.
George E. Hurd.
E. A. Lohrke.
McKenzie & McKenzie.
HAMILTON.
R. A. O'Hara.
HARLEM.
R. V. Bottomly.
HAVRE.
H. S. Kline.
HELENA.
Wm. Scallon.
KALISPELL.
Hans Walchi.
LEWISTON.
Edgar G. Worden.
E. K. Cheadle.
LIVINGSTON.
Miller & O'Connor.
MELSTONE.
J. P. P. Healy.
MILES CITY.
Geo. W. Farr.
C. H. Loud.
S. D. McKinnon.
W. H. Wasner.
Sharpless Walker.
PHILIPSBURG.
Wingfield L. Brown.
PLENTYWOOD.
L. J. Onstad.
POPLAR.
G. E. Ericson.
ROUNDUP.
Thos. J. Mathews.
SCOBEY.
Geo. Cudhie.
STANFORD.
A. D. Strouf.
WHITEFISH.
Geo. L. Rynerson.

NEBRASKA.

ALLIANCE.
Harry E. Gantz.
ASHLAND.
I. C. Buell.
AURORA.
M. F. Stanley.
BEATRICE.
L. H. Laughlin.
BEAVER CITY.
Lambe & Butler.
BLAIR.
O'Hanlon, Maher & O'Hanlon.
BRIDGEPORT.
R. O. Canaday.
BROKEN BOW.
N. T. Gadd.
Sullivan, Squires & Johnson.
CHADRON.
A. G. Fisher.
COLUMBUS.
A. M. Post.
Louis Lightner.
DAVID CITY.
E. A. Coufal.
DAKOTA.
George W. Leamer.
ELMWOOD.
J. A. Capwell.
FALLS CITY.
R. C. James.
FREMONT.
Geo. L. Loomis.
Abbott, Rohn & Robins.
GERING.
Curtis O. Lyda.
GRAND ISLAND.
Arthur C. Mayer.
Dale P. Stough.
HARTINGTON.
B. Ready.
HASTINGS.
John A. Lawler.
HOLDREGE.
W. A. Dilworth.
IMPERIAL.
Edmund D. Shipley.
KEARNEY.
Ed. P. McDermott.
H. M. Sinclair.
KIMBALL.
Wm. J. Ballard.
Roland V. Rodman.
O. A. Torgerson.
LINCOLN.
Geo. A. Adams.
Harry R. Ankeny.
G. W. Berge.
L. C. Burr.
T. J. Doyle.
E. J. Hainer.
Robert R. Hahn.
R. S. Mockett.
Chas. S. Roe.
Stewart, Perry & Stewart.
Roy H. Walford.
B. G. Westover.
McCOOK.
Scott & Scott.
MONOWI.
M. T. Post.
NEWMAN GROVE.
H. Halderson.
OMAHA.
Baker & Ready.
Byron Clark.
Crofoot, Fraser & Connolly.

OMAHA.
De La Matre & De La Matre.
H. Fisher.
J. A. C. Kennedy.
J. P. Palmer.
James E. Rait.
Warren Switzler.
Weaver & Giller.
Arthur R. Wells.
Gaines, Ziegler, Van Orsdel & Gaines.
Gurley, Fitch, West & Hickman.
Edward L. Bradley.
John G. Kuhn.
John M. McFarland.
Guy R. C. Read.
Wm. R. Patrick.
J. J. Friedman.
Stanley M. Rosewater.
Richard F. Stout.
Geo. B. Thummell.
Everett C. Wilson.

O'NEILL.
Clifford B. Scott.

PIERCE.
M. H. Leamy.

RED CLOUD.
F. J. Munday.

RISING CITY.
Elwood S. Jones.

SCHUYLER.
W. I. Allen.
George W. Wertz.

STANTON.
Geo. A. Eberly.

STOCKVILLE.
L. H. Cheney.

TRENTON.
H. P. Armitage.

WEST POINT.
O. C. Anderson.

YORK.
Geo. M. Spurlock.

NEVADA.

CARSON CITY.
Benson Wright.

RENO.
Geo. S. Brown.
Hermon R. Cooke.
James D. Finch.
Robert Lewers.
Nixon & Richards.
Samuel Platt.

ELKO.
H. U. Castle.

LAS VEGAS.
Leo A. McNamee.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

CLAREMONT.
H. W. Parker.

CONCORD.
Foster & Lake.

DOVER.
Raymond G. Brown.

LACONIA.
Stanton Owen.

LANCASTER.
Drew, Shurtleff & Morris.

MANCHESTER.
Warren, Howe & Wilson.

ROCHESTER.
Leslie P. Snow.

WHITEFIELD.
E. M. Bowker.

NEW JERSEY.

ATLANTIC CITY.
U. G. Styron.

BRIDGETON.
Le Roy W. Loder.

HOBOKEN.
Stuhr & Vogt.

JERSEY CITY.
Collins & Corbin.
Hartshorne, Insley & Vreeland.

MORRISTOWN.
George G. Runyon.
C. F. Wilson.

NEWARK.
Claude D. Graton.

SHREWSBURY.
Theodore D. Parsons

NEW MEXICO.

ALAMAGORDO.
Lee R. York.

ALBUQUERQUE.
C. M. Botts.
O. N. Marron.
Geo. C. Taylor.
John Venable.

CARLSBAD.
S. D. Stennis, Jr.

CLOVIS.
Harry L. Patton.

PORTALES.
Geo. L. Reese.

RATON.
H. L. Bickley.
J. Leahy.
O. N. Phillips.

ROSWELL.
Hiram M. Dow.
Reid & Hervey.

SANTA FE.
Colin Neblett.

SILVER CITY.
F. W. Vellacott.

TUCUMCARI.
James L. Briscoe.

NEW YORK.

BROOKLYN.
Hugo Hirsh.

BUFFALO.
August Becker.
M. F. Dirnberger.
Adelbert Moot.

JAMESTOWN.
E. W. Cordingley.
Mott & Ottoway.

NEW YORK.
Alfonso Bivona.
David T. Davis.
F. A. W. Ireland.
Noel Sargent.
Geo. Urquhart.
Everett P. Wheeler.
I. Maurice Wormser.
Frank V. Whiting.
C. L. Williamson.

SYOSSET.
E. L. Winthrop, Jr.

SYRACUSE.
D. A. Pierce.

VERBANK.
E. A. Ames.

NORTH CAROLINA.

ASHEVILLE.
Louis M. Bourne.
Mark W. Brown.
A. C. Chalmers.
Martin, Rollins & Wright.
McKinley Pritchard.

CHARLOTTE.
Marvin L. Ritch.

DURHAM.
Wm. G. Bramham.

GREENSBORO.
R. R. King, Jr.

HIDDENITE.
V. G. Beckham.

FAYETTEVILLE.
Q. K. Nimock.

HIGH POINT.
Roberson & Dalton.

KINSTON.
Powers & Elliott
Fred I. Sutton.

LILLINGTON.
J. R. Baggett.

MADISON.
Junius C. Brown.

MARION.
J. W. Pless.

NEWBERN.
A. D. Ward.

PLYMOUTH.
Zeb Vance Norman.

RALEIGH.
Murray Allen.
Pou, Bailey & Pou.

ROWLAND.
W. E. Lynch.

SHELBY.
Ryburn & Hoey.

SPARTA.
Geo. Cheek.

SWAN QUARTER.
C. B. Spencer.

WAKE FOREST.
E. W. Timberlake, Jr.

WALLACE.
Geo. R. Ward.

WASHINGTON.
Wiley C. Rodman.

WELDON.
Ashley B. Stainback.

WILSON.
D. M. Hill.

WILMINGTON.
P. C. Smith.
Isaac C. Wright.

WINSTON SALEM.
Burton Craige.
Hastings & Whicher.
Fred S. Hutchins.

NORTH DAKOTA.

ALEXANDER.
Robert Norheim.

ARNEGARD.
Adolph I. Haller.

ASHLEY.
A. A. Ludwigs.

BEACH.
R. F. Gallagher.

BISMARCK.
Benton Baker.

CARSON.
A. T. Nelson.

DEVIL'S LAKE.
Arthur R. Smythe.
Amasa E. Wheeler.

ENDERLIN.
Chas. G. Bangert.

FESSENDEN.
B. F. Whipple.

FARGO.
Francis X. Kirsch.
Lawrence & Murphy.
Augustus Roberts.

GRAND FORKS.
Geo. A. Bangs.
T. R. Bangs.
Svenbjorn Johnson.
W. A. McIntyre.
O'Connor & Peterson.

HATTON.
Chas. A. Lyche.

JAMESTOWN.
C. S. Buck.
F. G. Kneeland.
Oscar J. Seiler.

LANGDON.
G. Grimson.

LISBON.
Kvello & Adams.
Hugo P. Remington.

MINOT.
John E. Greene.
F. J. Funke.

McCLUSKY.
Frank I. Temple.

MOTT.
Jacobsen & Murray.

PORTAL.
C. H. Marshall.

RHAME.
J. W. Lee.

RUGBY.
Paul Campbell.
Harold B. Nelson.

TURTLE LAKE.
C. L. Foster.

VALLEY CITY.
W. E. Grantham.

WILLISTON.
John J. Murphy & Ivan V. Metzger.

OHIO.

AKRON.
Edwin W. Brouse.
O. W. Naef.
W. E. Young.

ALLIANCE.
Wm. L. Hart.

ASHTABULA.
Sheldon & Rinto.

BELLAIRE.
C. C. Sedgwick.
West & West.

BELLEFONTAINE.
W. Clay Huston.

BRYAN.
David A. Webster.

CANTON.
Austin Lynch.
Loren E. Souers.

BUCYRUS.
Benjamin Meck.

CINCINNATI.
Vincent H. Beckman.
Bettinger, Schmitt & Kreis.
Otway J. Cosgrave.
Henry Baer.
Johnson & Levy.
Mallon & Vordenberg.
Chas. B. Smith.
Chas. H. Stephens.
Jas. B. Swing.

CLEVELAND.
Boyd, Cannon, Brooks & Wickham.
Geo. B. Marty.
Morganstern & Morgenstern.
Wm. Howell.
Thos. L. Johnson.
P. L. A. Leighley.
Locher, Green & Woods.
J. H. Orgill.
Payer, Winch, Minshall & Karch.
H. G. Schaibly.

COLUMBUS.
W. H. Miller.
Morton, Irvine & Blanchard.
Wm. K. Williams.
James M. Hengst.

CONNEAUT.
J. E. Helman.
R. E. Mygatt.

DAYTON.
Frank S. Breene.
W. S. McConnaughey.

DELAWARE.
J. R. Selover.
DELPHOS.
R. A. Lindeman.
EAST CLEVELAND.
Benn B. Rosenfeld.
EAST LIVERPOOL.
M. J. McGarry.
EAST PALESTINE.
L. M. Kyes.
ELYRIA.
D. J. Nye.
R. F. Vandermark.
Frank Wilford.
FINDLAY.
Wm. F. Duncan.
F. E. Hurley.
FREMONT.
Culbert & Culbert.
HAMILTON.
Edgar A. Belden.
IRONTON.
Wayne L. Elkins.
A. R. Johnson.
LIMA.
D. J. Cable.
Jas. W. Halfhill.
LISBON.
Billingsley, Moore & Van Fossan.
LORAIN.
D. H. Aiken.
MARIETTA.
C. C. Middleswart.
MARION.
Scofield, Durfee & Scofield.
MIDDLETON.
Ben F. Harwitz.
Palmer & Elliott.
MONTPELIER.
W. H. Shinn.
OTTAWA.
Bailey & Leasure.
POMEROY.
L. Crary Davis.
RAVENNA.
W. J. Beckley.
H. R. Loomis.
RITTMAN.
K. E. Hoover.
ST. CLAIRSVILLE.
Earl R. Lewis.
SIDNEY.
J. D. Barnes.
Chas. C. Hall.
Chas C. Marshall.
SPRINGFIELD.
A. C. Link.
Paul C. Martin.
W. M. Rockel.
TOLEDO.
Geo. P. Hahn.
Holbrook. Banker & Lewis.
Frank C. Lewis.
Elmer E. Davis.
Herbert P. Whitney.
VAN WERT.
H. L. Conn.
WARREN.
Paul E. Kightlinger.
WASHINGTON, C. H.
Thos. S. Maddox.
WAUSEON.
Paxson & Canfield.
WELLSVILLE.
Chas. Boyd.
W. F. Lones.
James E. O'Grady.
YOUNGSTOWN.
Chas. J. Jackson.
John Ruffalo.

OKLAHOMA.

ADA.
A. E. Chaney.
B. H. Epperson.
AFTON.
C. P. Fillebrown.
ANADARKO.
C. H. Carswell.
W. O. Croy.
ARDMORE.
F. M. Adams
Geo. A. Ahern.
H. A. Ledbetter.
Andrew B. Riddle.
Hugh W. Rose.
BARTLESVILLE.
R. H. Hudson.
Hayes McCoy.
BRISTOW.
W. L. Cheatham.
CUSHING.
Higgins & Berton.
DRUMRIGHT.
Frank Hickman.
Fred A. Wagoner.
DURANT.
Hatchett & Ferguson.
Chas. E. McPherren.
Walter J. Turnbull.
W. E. Utterback.
ELK CITY.
J. M. Bishop.
EL RENO.
W. E. Bennett.
IDABEL.
Gilbert W. Daney.
KINGFISHER.
D. K. Cunningham.
McALESTER.
L. C. Counts.
A. C. Markley.
MIAMI.
Webster & Webster.
MUSKOGEE.
J. B. Campbell.
Thos. F. Crosby.
J. B. Furry.
Chas. A. Moon.
Geo. S. Ramsey.
Malcolm E. Rosser.
NEWKIRK.
T. J. Sargent.
OKLAHOMA CITY.
Henry E. Asp.
Harry L. Ballard.
Walter Benson.
E. B. Bradshaw.
W. A. Briggs.
Burns & Lillard.
J. D. Chastain.
C. C. Christison.
Embry, Johnson & Kidd.
Joel S. Estes.
Geo. W. Fields.
Henry L. Goddard.
J. Q. A. Harrod.
Samuel W. Hayes.
W. A. Ledbetter.
Wallace C. Lee.
Albert L. McRill.
Loyal J. Miller.
J. S. Ross.
Selby & Callihan.
Stuart, Cruce & Cruce.
Suits & Hall.
H. A. Wilkinson.
OKMULGEE.
Chas. A. Dickson.
PAWHUSKA.
Leahy & Macdonald.
PONCA CITY.
David L. Carter.
TALAGO.
W. P. Hickok.
TULSA.
Carroll & Mason.
Geo. E. Reeves.
VINITA.
Jess L. Ballard.
WAGONER.
C. E. Castle.
WALTERS.
Amil H. Japp.
WOODWARD.
Sherman M. Smith.

OREGON.

ALBANY.
Gale S. Hill.
J. R. Wyatt.
ASTORIA.
J. J. Barrett.
James L. Hope.
BEND.
Ross Farnham.
BURNS.
J. W. Biggs.
CANYON CITY.
Geo. H. Cattanach.
CHESTER.
Wm. B. Northam.
CONDON.
T. A. Weinke.
ELGIN.
L. Denham.
ENTERPRISE.
A. S. Cooley.
D. W. Sheahan.
GLENDALE.
Oliver S. Brown.
HEPPNER.
C. L. Sweek.
LA GRANDE.
H. E. Dixon.
KLAMATH FALLS.
Wm. Ganong.
MARSHFIELD.
E. Lothard McClure.
MYRTLE POINT.
C. H. Giles.
OREGON CITY.
C. D. & D. C. Latourette.
PENDLETON.
Raley & Raley.
PORTLAND.
W. C. Bristol.
Thos. G. Greene.
D. C. Lewis.
John McCourt.
Sanderson Reed.
Isham N. Smith.
J. O. Stearns.
PRINEVILLE.
N. G. Wallace.
ROSEBURG.
B. L. Eddy.
M. F. Rice.
SALEM.
John H. Carson.
VALE.
Geo. E. Davis.

PENNSYLVANIA.

ALTOONA.
W. E. Mackey.
Robt. A. Henderson.
BUTLER.
Thomas O. Cratty.
CHARLEROI.
Hugh E. Fergus.
CHESTER.
Wm. B. Northam.
COATESVILLE.
Robert L. Templin.
DU BOIS.
L. D. McCall.
FRANKLIN.
Geo. S. Criswell, Jr.
HARRISBURG.
Wm. Jenkins Wilcox.
HERSHEY.
John E. Snyder.
LEWISBURG.
H. M. McClure.
NEWCASTLE.
J. Norman Martin.
OIL CITY.
H. C. Dorworth.
PHILADELPHIA.
W. A. Melcher.
Walter George Smith.
L. N. Sharpe.
Wm. Jay Turner.
PHILIPSBURG.
M. W. Fleming.
PITTSBURGH.
Homer Adams.
W. Clyde Grubbs.
POTTSVILLE.
J. A. Noecker.
SCRANTON.
W. J. Fitzgerald.
SUNBURY.
C. M. Clement.
UNIONTOWN.
Harry W. Byrne.
Carr & Carr.
WARREN.
S. L. Meyer.
WASHINGTON.
Jas. I. Brownson, Jr.
WAYNE.
Chas. Howson.
WILKES-BARRE.
Miss Sophia O'Hara.
WILLIAMSPORT
Mortimer C. Rhone.
YORK.
Walter B. Hays.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

MANILA.
W. A. Kincaid.
Jos. N. Wolfson.

PORTO RICO.

SAN JUAN.
Luis Munoz Morales.

RHODE ISLAND.

PROVIDENCE.
Cooney & Cooney.
Wm. A. Gunning.
Thomas Z. Lee.
Fred Rueckert.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

ANDERSON.
C. B. Earle.
H. C. Miller.
BISHOPVILLE.
C. B. Ruffin.
BLACKVILLE.
A. H. Ninestein.
CHARLESTON.
Wm. Austin.
Mitchell & Smith.
John I. Cosgrove.
Wm. H. Grimball.
Wm. P. Tillinghast.
CHESTER.
M. L. Marion.
COLUMBIA.
Barron, McKay, Frierson & McCants.
Edw. L. Craig.
De Pass & De Pass.
Jas. H. Fowles.
Clinton T. Graydon.
R. Y. Kibler.
Jos. L. Nettles.
Frank G. Tompkins.

CONWAY.
J. O. Norton.

DARLINGTON.
T. C. Cork.
E. C. Dennis.

DILLON.
L. B. Haselden.
W. H. Muller.

FLORENCE.
Arrowsmith, Muldrow, Bridges & Hicks.
G. O. Cox.

GAFFNEY.
R. A. Dobson.

GREENVILLE.
Julia D. Charles.
Haynsworth & Haynsworth.
B. F. Martin.
J. Robert Martin.
Stephen Nettles.
B. F. Perry, Jr.

LAURENS.
Dial & Todd.

NEWBERRY.
Geo. B. Cromer.

PICKENS.
McSwain & Craig.

RIDGELAND.
H. Klugh Purdy.

SALUDA.
C. J. Ramage.

ST. GEORGE.
St. Clair Muckenfuss.

SPARTANBURG.
Cornelius Otts.
Brown & Boyd.
Carson & Tinley.
J. W. Mansfield.
C. E. Daniel.

SUMTER.
Shepard K. Nash.

UNION.
J. Ashby Sawyer.

SOUTH DAKOTA.

ABERDEEN.
Thos. L. Arnold.
W. F. Corrigan.
G. N. Williamson.

BELLE FOURCHE.
J. W. Malvin.
L. M. Simons.
C. P. Seward.

CHAMBERLAIN.
E. R. Slifer.

DEADWOOD.
John R. Russell.

DELL RAPIDS.
Krause & Krause.

DE SMET.
W. H. Warren.

ELK POINT.
Thos. McInerny.

FAULKTON.
Paul Byrne.

GETTYSBURG.
Robert B. Fisk.

HURON.
A. K. Gardner.
Chas. P. Warren.

LEAD.
Chambers Kellar.
John Walsh.

MADISON.
Ira F. Blewett.

MITCHELL.
Herbert E. Hitchcock.

NEWELL.
O. E. Farnham.

PARKER.
C. L. Jones.

PIERRE.
Chas. E. Deland.

PHILIP.
Philip & Waggoner.

PLANKINGTON.
Donald Fellows.

RAPID CITY.
Frank D. Bangs.
Albert R. Denu.
Geo. A. Jeffers.
Chas. A. Nystrom.

REDFIELD.
S. W. Clark.

SALEM.
H. Van Ruschen.

SIOUX FALLS.
Martin Bergh.
U. S. G. Cherry.
John C. Mundt.
Teigen & Davis.
R. W. Parliman.

WATERTOWN.
Hanten, Hanten & Gault.
Daniel K. Loucks.
Loucks, Hasche & Foley.
James G. McFarland.
Mark W. Sheafe, Jr.
Mather & Stover.

WEBSTER.
P. W. Dougherty.

WILLOW LAKE.
D. L. Olson.

WINNER.
Claude Maule.

YANKTON.
Eldon W. Clark.
Henry Kunkle.

TENNESSEE.

CHATTANOOGA.
John A. Chambliss.
John H. Early.
Fleming & Shepherd.
Floyd Estill.
Geo. D. Lancaster.
C. S. Littleton.
Jos. V. Williams.

COLUMBIA.
Thos. H. Peebles.

FAYETTEVILLE.
Routt, Myers & Crawford.

GALLATIN.
D. B. Bell.
J. M. McDonald.

HARRIMAN.
Sam A. Breazale.

JELLICO.
H. K. Tramell.

JOHNSON CITY.
H. G. Morison.

KINGSPORT.
F. J. Heazel.

KNOXVILLE.
Lewis M. G. Baker.
Thos. L. Carty.
Chas. T. Cates, Jr.
John W. Green.
Lindsley, Young & Donaldson.
Norman B. Morrell.
Roy H. Beeler.
Harley G. Fowler.
J. N. Rose.
Ben R. Winick.
Robt. M. Jones.
Pickle, Turner, Kennedy & Cate.
R. L. Pope.
Smith, Word & Anderson.

LAWRENCEBURG.
Noble L. Freeman.

MEMPHIS.
R. P. Cary.
Abe Cohen.
Henry G. Evans.
Chas. N. Fox.
S. A. Gadsey.
Miss Marion Griffin.
Clyde H. Koen.
L. J. Monteverde.
Philip A. Rush.
G. T. Fitzhugh.
Allen Hughes.
Milton B. Rose.
Wright & Wright.

MILAN.
J. P. Rhodes.

NASHVILLE.
R. B. C. Howell.
Jos. C. Higgins.
P. D. Maddin.
W. E. Norvell.

NEWBERN.
John M. Drane.

WINCHESTER.
Arthur Crownover.

TEXAS.

ABILENE
R. C. Chambers.
Dallas Scarborough.

AMARILLO.
F. A. Cooper.
J. V. Guleke.

ANGLETON.
A. E. Masterson.

ANSON.
Walter S. Pope.

AUSTIN.
T. H. McGregor.
Garrett, Brownlee & Goldsmith.
G. B. Smedley.
N. A. Stedman.
Ike D. White.

BEAUMONT.
A. Ludlow Calhoun.
John M. Conley.
Y. D. Carroll.
Jas. A. Harrison.
F. O. Holt.
A. D. Lipscomb.
David E. O'Fiel.
C. E. Pool.
Tom C. Stephenson.

BEEVILLE.
Jas. R. Dougherty.

BRADY.
S. W. Hughes.

BRECKINRIDGE.
G. O. Bateman.
J. Webster Darden.

BROWNSVILLE.
Jas. A. Graham.
Ira Webster.

BUFFALO.
John A. Newsom.

CARRIZO SPRINGS.
A. P. Johnson.

CISCO.
B. W. Patterson.

CLEBURNE.
Walker & Baker.

COLEMAN.
Snodgrass & Dibrell.

COLUMBUS.
Grobe & Miller.

COMANCHE.
Y. W. Holmes.

CORPUS CHRISTI.
John S. McCampbell.
Robert W. Stayton.

CORSICANA.
W. A. Tarver.

DALHART.
A. W. Schlofman.
Tatum & Strong.

DALLAS.
W. S. Bramlett.
Clark & Clark.
A. A. Cocke.
E. A. Coker.
R. V. Davidson.
Dreeben & Pierson.
Geo. Clifton Edwards.
F. M. Etheridge.
J. W. Gormley.
W. H. Graham.
W. T. Henderson.
Victor H. Hexter.
Thos. A. Knight.
Harry P. Lawther.
A. H. McKnight.
R. C. Merritt
Walter M. Nold.
M. M. Parks.
Seay & Bailey.
Seay, Seay, Malone & Lipscomb.
U. F. Short.
C. M. Smithdeal.
Wendel Spence.
Templeton, Beall, Williams & Callaway.
Thompson, Knight, Baker & Harris.
M. W. Townsend.
G. L. Youngblood.

DENTON.
J. W. Sullivan.

EASTLAND.
J. M. Ferrell.

EL PASO.
Dyer, Croom & Jones.
J. M. Goggin.
S. J. Isaacks.
Robt. T. Neill.
J. A. Richardson.
J. L. Stewart.
Jos. U. Sweeney.
Turner, Culwell, Holliday & Pollard.

FT. WORTH.
Capps & Canty.
P. W. Brown.
Lee, Lomax & Smith.
R. M. Rowland.
John W. Wray.
George Thompson.
Peter Arnold.
J. H. Barwise, Jr.
H. T. Cooper.
Dee Estes.
Laurence Gernsbacher.
O. W. Gillespie.
O. M. Herring.
Robert N. McMillen.
Arthur L. Moore.
J. M. Mothershead.
W. M. Odell.
John L. Poulter.
A. J. Power.
H P. Shead.
Geo. F. Seideman.
V. K. Wedgworth.
J. Ado Whiteside.

GAINESVILLE.
W. E. Murphy.
J. L. Tippit.

GALVESTON.
John L. Darrouzet.
James W. Wayman.
James B. & Charles J. Stubbs.
John T. Wheeler.
Bryan F. Williams.

GEORGETOWN.
Wilcox & Graves.

GOOSE CREEK.
S. T. Deason.

GRAHAM.
C. F. Marshall.

GREENVILLE.
Crosby & Harrell.

HAMILTON.
P. M. Rice.
HEARNE.
J. F. Lane.
HEMPSTEAD.
R. E. Tompkins.
HONEY GROVE.
J. I. Warren.
HOUSTON.
Virgil E. Arnold.
John F. Battaile.
Frank L. Bender.
Jack Ciulla.
Robert L. Cole.
W. L. Cook.
Dannebaum, Amerman & Sears.
Fuller & Fuller.
Krahl & Freeman.
D. Edward Greer.
Harris & Harris.
T. J. Lawhon.
J. W. Lockett.
John G. Logue.
R. F. Louis.
Mathis, Teague & Mathis.
J. V. Meek.
John W. Parker.
Thos. C. Rowe.
J. H. Tallichet.
Otto Taub.
Turnley & Clark.
JACKSONVILLE.
Lee G. Carter.
LAREDO.
Asher R. Smith.
LONGVIEW.
W. C. Hurst.
Young & Stinchcomb.
LULING.
W. O. Slater.
MARSHALL.
F. H. Prendergast.
MEXIA.
O. M. Wrol.
MINERAL WELLS.
Ritchie & Ranspot.
Smith & Smith.
NEW BOSTON.
L. R. Atkins.
PADUCAH.
Clifford Graves.
PALACIOS.
W. C. Gray.
PLAINVIEW.
M. J. Baird.
PORT ARTHUR.
Jos. Palica.
J. E. Rose.
J. W. Williams.
V. J. Wistner.
RIO GRANDE CITY.
R. Oosterveen.
ROCKPORT.
Gordon Gibson.
SAN ANTONIO.
Robert L. Ball.
Claude V. Birkhead.
Charles Dittmar.
J. D. Dodson.
Graham Dowdell.
Geo. W. Huntress.
O. H. E. Kramer.
C. R. McFarlane.
Solon Stewart.
Terrell, Walthall & Terrell.
SHERMAN.
C. B. Randell.
G. P. Webb.
SPUR.
W. D. Wilson.
STEPHENVILLE.
E. T. Chandler.
SULPHUR SPRINGS.
C. E. Beasley.
TEMPLE.
Sam D. Snodgrass.
TEXARKANA.
R. W. Rogers.
King & Mahaffey.
Wheeler & Robison.
TYLER.
Johnson, Edwards & Hughes.
Troy Smith.
VERNON.
R. D. Killough.
WACO.
Nat Harris.
Harry P. Jordan.
R. O. Stotter.
O. L. Stribling.
D. A. Kelley.
W. M. Sleeper.
Weatherby & Rogers.
WAXAHACHIE.
J. L. Gammon.
WICHITA FALLS.
A. H. Britain.
Ewalt & Waggener.
Bert King.
WILLS POINT.
Wynne & Wynne.

UTAH.

FILLMORE.
T. M. Ivory.
LOGAN.
J. C. Walters.
Ernest T. Young.
MOUNT PLEASANT.
James W. Cherry.
OGDEN.
C. A. Boyd.
Geo. Halverson.
A. G. Horn.
C. H. Hollingsworth.
SALT LAKE CITY.
E. M. Bagley.
G. W. Bartch.
Booth & Lee.
W. M. Bradley.
L. Eggertsen Cluff
E. B. Critchlow.
W. M. Folland.
H. R. Macmillan.
Thos. Marioneaux.
Thomas Ramage.
Skeen & Skeen.
Ray Van Cott.
Waldemar Van Cott.
J. T. Wooton.

VERMONT.

BETHEL.
Guy Wilson.
ISLAND POND.
Harry B. Amey.
MONTPELIER.
Fred Laird.
NEWPORT.
Walter H. Cleary.
NORTHFIELD.
Plumley & Plumley.
ST. ALBANS.
Geo. Hogan.
ST. JOHNSBURY.
Harry Blodgett.

VIRGINIA.

ARRINGTON.
Will T. Snyder.
CLIFTON FORGE.
O. B. Harvey.
DANVILLE.
Aiken & Watson.
EASTVILLE.
Louis S. Sacks.
GATE CITY.
Will H. Nickels.
HARRISONBURG.
D. O. Dechert.
HILLSVILLE.
L. E. Lindsay.
LEESBURG.
Edwin E. Garrett.
LEXINGTON.
H. St. George Tucker.
LYNCHBURG.
Duncan Drysdale.
MARION.
Geo. F. Cook.
NORFOLK.
R. W. Peatross.
Thomas W. Shelton.
PETERSBURG.
Bernard Mann.
Plummer & Bohannan.
PHOEBUS.
W. H. Powers.
RICHMOND.
Sherlock Bronson.
Geo. Bryan.
A. W. Patterson.
Lawrence P. Pool.
Robt. E. Scott.
Robert H. Talley.
Thos. I. Talley.
ROANOKE.
W. Bruce Buford.
E. C. Dickerson.
Jackson & Henson.
Staples & Cocke.
Woods, Chitwood & Coxe.
SALEM.
J. P. Saul, Jr.
STAUNTON.
Taylor McCoy.
VICTORIA.
Geo. E. Allen.
WARRENTON.
Wm. Horgan.
WINCHESTER.
Warren Rice.

WASHINGTON.

ABERDEEN.
A. E. Graham.
CHELALIS.
Gus C. Thacker.
COLVILLE.
W. Lon Johnson.
ELLENSBURG.
John H. McDaniels.
J. A. Whitfield.
HARRINGTON.
H. W. Reading.
MOUNT VERNON.
Wilbra Coleman.
NORTH YAKIMA.
I. J. Bounds.
OKANOGAN.
O. H. Neal.
OMAK.
Carl N. Woods.
PORT TOWNSEND.
A. R. Coleman.
REPUBLIC.
Jas. T. Johnson.
ROSALIA.
Chas. E. Fleming.
SEATTLE.
Edward Brady.
Vivian M. Carkeek.
Carver & Slattery.
C. E. Claypool.
Grover E. Desmond.
SEATTLE.
John F. Dore.
Cassius E. Gates.
Carroll B. Graves.
James A. Haight.
James B. Howe.
McClure & McClure.
W. G. McLaren.
Wm. Parmerlee
Fred H. Peterson.
Winter S. Martin.
Harold Preston.
H. J. Ramsey.
John W. Roberts.
Martin Rozema.
Roberts, Wilson & Skeel.
John J. Sullivan.
SHELTON.
M. W. Logan.
SOUTH BEND.
Herman Murray.
SPOKANE.
Cannon & Ferris.
F. H. Graves.
Nuzum, Clark & Nuzum.
J. B. Lindsley.
TACOMA.
Chas. O. Bates.
Ellis, Fletcher & Evans.
M. A. Langhorne.
Lund & Lund.
Raymond J. McMillan.
H. G. & Dix Rowland.
Sullivan & Christian.
WALLA WALLA.
W. G. Coleman.
Geo. W. Thompson.
WENATCHEE.
Frederick G. B. Kemp.
WILBUR.
C. M. N. Love
YAKIMA.
M. C. Delle.
Thos. E. Grady

WEST VIRGINIA.

BECKLEY.
C. Overton Dunn.
Harley M. Kilgore
M. L. Painter
BLUEFIELD.
Arthur F. Kingdon.
Lee & Tanner.
CHARLESTON.
Bowers & Gilchrist.
Koontz & Hurlbutt
McClintic, Mathews & Campbell.
Payne, Minor & Bouchelle.
Harry E. Penhale.
Price, Smith, Spilman & Clay.
M. F. Stiles.
CLARKSBURG.
Stephen G. Jackson.
Stout & Meredino.
CLAY.
B. C. Eakle.
FAIRMONT.
Paul G. Armstrong.
Trevey Nutter
FAYETTEVILLE.
Dillon & Nuckolls.
GRAFTON.
J. Guy Allender.
W. Merle Watkins.
HINTON.
Thos. N. Read.

HUNTINGTON.
Fitzpatrick, Campbell, Brown & Davis.
P. D. Garda.
Vinson, Thompson, Meek & Renshaw.

MARLINTON
S. H. Sharp.

MARTINSBURG.
Clarence E. Martin.

MORGANTOWN.
Wm. C. Cramer.

PARKERSBURG.
Merrick & Smith.
F. P. Moats.
Van Winkle & Ambler.
W. H. Wolfe.

PINEVILLE.
J. Albert Toler.

POINT PLEASANT.
Chas. E. Hogg.

SPENCER.
Thos. P. Ryan.

WELLSBURG.
F. A. Chapman.

WHEELING.
McCamic & Clarke.
J. Bernard Handlan.

WESTON.
Robert L. Bland.
W. W. Brannon.

WILLIAMSON
John H. Greene.
Wiles & Bias.
Lant R. Slaven.

WISCONSIN.

ANTIGO.
Chas H. Avery.

APPLETON.
L. Hugo Keller.

ARCADIA.
Frank E. Hebert.

ASHLAND.
Allan T. Pray.

BARABOO.
J. W. Frenz.

BELOIT.
H. W. Adams.

BURLINGTON.
Louis H. Rohr.

COLBY.
Frank A. Jackson.

EAU CLAIRE.
C. T. Bundy.

FOND DU LAC.
Martin & Martin.
A. D. Sutherland.
L. A. Williams.

GRAND RAPIDS.
Chas. E. Briere.
Frank W. Calkins.

GREEN BAY.
Samuel La Violette.
Minahan, Minahan, Minahan and Duquaine.
Rex I. McCreery.
A. D. McGruer.
Gittings & Moyle.
Sheridan & Evrard.
A. McComb.
Dennison Wheelock.

HARTFORD.
Sawyer & Sawyer.

HUDSON.
Baker & Haven.

LA CROSSE.
Geo. H. Gordon
A. H. Schubert.

LADYSMITH.
O. J. Falge.

MADISON.
Buell & Lucas.
Gilbert & Ela.
S. A. Madigan.
S. A. Madigan.

MANITOWOC.
Emil Baensch.
E. S. Schmitz.

MERRILL.
Runke & Naffz.

MILWAUKEE.
Alexander & Burke.
Bottum, Bottum, Hudnall & Lecher.
Bohmrick & Gabel.
Harvey M. Burns.
Emmet J. Carrigan.
Walter D. Corrigan.
Curtis & Mock.
H. L. Eaton.
H. F. Friedrich.

MILWAUKEE.
B. M. Goldman.
John A. F. Groth.
Andrew Gilbertson.
W. A. Hayes.
Ulrich Hiller.
F. P. Hopkins.
H. R. Manger.
Thos. A. Manning.
Robert N. McMynn.
Max Mysell.
N. B. Neelen.
Olwell, Durant & Brady.
J. L. O'Connor.
Rix & Barney.
Dale C. Shockley.
Henry S. Sloan.
A. G. Schwefel.
Henry W. Stark.
W. O. Thomas.
Hugo J. Trost.
Van Dyke, Shaw, Muskat & Van Dyke.
Clifton Williams.

OSHKOSH.
John W. Hume.
Frank B. Keefe.

OWEN.
Bert C. Bently.

PLATTEVILLE.
Jesse J. Ruble.

PORTAGE.
Daniel H. Grady.

PRAIRIE DU CHIEN.
J. P. Evans.
W. R. Graves.

RACINE.
C. O. Bergener.
Chas. Krenzke.
John H. Liegler.
Gittings & Moyle.

RHINELANDER.
E. D. Minahan.

SHEBOYGAN.
Wm. B. Collins.

STURGEON BAY.
W. E. Wagener.

SUPERIOR.
W. R. Foley.

TOMAH.
D. E. Roberts.

VIROQUA.
J. Henry Bennett.

WATERTOWN.
Chas. R. Blumenfield.
John G. Conway.

WEST ALLIS.
Nicholas F. Lucas.

WEST SUPERIOR.
W. M. Steele.

WISCONSIN RAPIDS.
Goggins & Brazeau.

WYOMING.

CASPER.
Alfred R. Lowey.
W. H. Patten.

CHEYENNE.
W. C. Kinkead.
Herbert V. Lacey.
Chas. E. Lane.
Osmer E. Smith.

GREYBULL.
Edw. H. Ellis.

ROCK SPRINGS.
F. W. Johnson.
Lewis H. Brown.
Rush L. De Nise.

SHERIDAN.
C. A. Kutcher.
Diefenderfer & Wakeman.

BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO.
Richard P. Momsen.

CANADA.

OTTAWA.
M. J. Griffin.

MONTREAL.
Victor E. Mitchell.

HALIFAX.
H. Mellish.

JAPAN.

TOKIO.
Chas. Pergler.

NEW ZEALAND.

WELLINGTON.
F. Harrison.

SCOTLAND.

GLASGOW.
Donald Mackay.